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1. INTRODUCTION
On a warm weekday afternoon on campus, I was sitting outside
studying and enjoying the balmy San Diego weather. I observed a
student park his car in a faculty parking spot and place the all-too-
familiar yellow parking citation under his windshield wiper.' As I
thought about this citation-avoidance strategy, I tried to. recreate this
student's thought process. He must have been thinking the following:
parking enforcement will come around eventually and notice that I do
not have a faculty parking permit but, seeing that this car's driver has
already been cited, will not cite me again. Admittedly, this strategy
seems intuitively logical. However, assuming parking enforcement was
fooled by this strategy-that is to say, assuming they were successfully
tricked into thinking that they had placed a citation under the windshield
wiper-I pondered whether parking enforcement could nonetheless cite
the vehicle's driver again. If so, then how often? Once a day? Every
time rounds are made? As often as citations can be drafted?
Suppose a legislature passes a statute which states that it shall be
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1. Considering the student parking availability to would-be parked vehicles ratio,
this student's behavior, while perhaps not justifiable, is not totally devoid of empathy.
unlawful for an individual to park her motor vehicle in front of a fire
hydrant. The penalty for a violation of the statute is, say, a $200 fine, or
three days in the county jail, or both. While the punishment may seem a
bit much, it is defensible, one might argue, because the offending party
creates a risk that property damage and personal injuries might increase
by hampering the fire department's efforts to control a possible fire.
Suppose finally, however, that the statute provides that it shall be a
separate offense for each hour a vehicle remains parked in front of a fire
hydrant.2 Thus, an individual who unlawfully parks her motor vehicle in
front of a fire hydrant and leaves it there for twenty-four hours is guilty
of twenty-four violations of the statute. If a defendant is found guilty on
all twenty-four counts and her sentences are to run consecutively, then
she would be exposed to a maximum of $4800 in fines, or seventy-two
days in jail, or both. This punishment must seem extreme, even for
staunch law-and-order proponents, but what limitations, if any, are there
on the passage of such a statute?'
This Comment will explore this issue. Part II will examine the
historical development and the Supreme Court's application of the so-
called rule of lenity when adjudicating cases involving statutes with
unclear units of prosecution Part II will also examine the manner in
which unclear draftsmanship has been treated in other areas of law and
2. This temporal definition of a crime shall be referred to in this Comment as a
unit of prosecution.
3. One would hope that common sense, as well as a sense of fairness, would
preclude the passage of such a statute. In any event, a judge (or jury) probably would
not sentence a defendant to the fullest extent of the law and probably would run her
sentences concurrently, as opposed to consecutively. Indeed, the hypothetical is perhaps
unrealistic enough to warrant such a response. However, keep this hypothetical in mind
while pondering the less ridiculous hypotheticals, as well as the actual-and, in some
cases, equally ridiculous-statutes discussed.
4. Noticeably absent in this Comment is a discussion of conspiracy, RICO, and
other complex criminal law, which has been omitted for a couple of reasons. First, there
is already a fair amount of literature on the subject. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner,
S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double Jeopardy and Compound Criminal Liability,
27 NEw. ENG. L. REv. 915 (1993); William H. Theis, The Double Jeopardy Defense and
Multiple Prosecutions for Conspiracy, 49 SMU L. REv. 269 (1996); Anne Bowen
Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex
Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 95 (1992).
Second, complex criminal activity does not provide a clear model. True, a conspiracy
can be individuated into temporal units for unit of prosecution purposes. For example, if
A and B conspire to commit a continuing offense over the course of a year, then a
legislature would have near plenary power (subject to limitations to be addressed in this
Comment) to individuate the conspiracy into days, weeks, or months for unit of
prosecution purposes. However, conspiracy normally has concomitant acts. For
example, A and B may do act C on day X in furtherance of their conspiracy. On day Y, A
and B do act D in furtherance of the same conspiracy. Hence, A and B have done two
different acts in furtherance of the same conspiracy, which detracts from the continuing
offense analysis.
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will compare those areas of law with the rationale behind the rule of
lenity. Finally, Part II will conclude by arguing that the rule of lenity
creates a presumption opposing multiple prosecutions for the continuing
violation of a statute, unless there is clear legislative intent to the
contrary.
Part M11 will examine the double jeopardy implications raised by unit
of prosecution cases. After a review of the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, Part III will conclude that, save for one exception,
the Double Jeopardy Clause should not be implicated in unit of
prosecution cases. Part IV will examine the history of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, including its
origin and historical application by the Supreme Court. It will also
examine some recent contradictory Supreme Court cases involving the
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Part IV will
conclude by arguing that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
should be read to encompass a limited proportionality requirement in
criminal punishment and, as a protection of last resort, should be
exercised to invalidate punishment that is grossly excessive when
compared to the sum total of culpable behavior exhibited by a criminal
defendant.
Part V will look at a few recent cases that have addressed the issue of
individuating continuous acts into temporal units of prosecution. The
model proposed in this Comment will then be applied to these cases in
order to analyze the extent to which various courts are recognizing the
judicial and constitutional issues implicated in these cases.
II. THE RULE OF LENYry
A. Its History
Lenity is the quality or state of being lenient.5 The rule of lenity
provides that "where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute
concerning multiple punishment, ambiguity should be resolved in favor
of lenity in sentencing."' The concept of strict statutory construction,
the precursor to the modem rule of lenity, was identified in Crepps v.
5. WEBsTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 684 (1989).
6. BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 902(6th ed. 1990).
Durden,7 an early English case. Crepps was charged with and convicted
of four violations of a statute which mandated that
noe Tradesman, Artificer Workeman Labourer or other Person whatsoever shall
doe or exercise any worldly Labour, Busines or Worke of their ordinary
Callings upon the Lords day or any part thereof (Workes of Necessity and
Charity onely excepted) And that ever person... shall for every such Offence
forfeit the summe of five shillings ....
Crepps was found to have sold four small hot loaves of bread.9 Crepps
sued in trespass in the King's Bench and a unanimous court held that
Crepps could violate the statute only once per day, irrespective of the
number of loaves sold or the number of customers to whom they were
sold.'o According to Lord Mansfield, "repeated offences are not the
object which the Legislature had in view in making the statute: but
singly, to punish a man for exercising his ordinary trade and calling on a
Sunday."' Hence, so held the Court, "[there can be but one entire
offence on one and the same day .... ,2 Note that Lord Mansfield
analyzed the statute not in terms of whether the Legislature possessed
the requisite authority to punish each discrete act of selling, but in terms
of whether the Legislature had in fact exercised this power in the words
of the statute.
American courts have approached the unit of prosecution issue in a
manner remarkably similar to the approach utilized in Crepps v.
Durden.3 The case of In re Snow 4 is an early American case wherein
strict statutory construction was invoked. Congress passed a statute
which declared "[t]hat if any male person... cohabits with more than
one woman, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... " Snow
was charged with and convicted of three counts of cohabiting with more
than one woman. 6 The three indictments alleged the same proscribed
conduct and differed only in their time periods, which roughly
corresponded to calendar years. 7
7. 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777).
8. Sunday Observance Act, 29 Car. 2, ch. 7 (1677) (Eng.).
9. See Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1284.
10. See id. at 1287.
11. Id.
12. Id. The reasoning in Crepps has been ratified by subsequent English cases.
See, e.g., B & Q (Retail) Ltd. v. Dudley Metro. Bor. Council, 86 L.G.R. 137 (D.C.
1987).
13. 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (KB. 1777).
14. 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
15. Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 31.
16. See Snow, 120 U.S. at 276-77. Snow was cohabiting with seven women
during the relevant time period. See id. at 276.
17. One indictment covered January 1 through December 31, 1883; the second
covered January 1 through December 31, 1884; and the third covered January 1 through
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As an initial premise, it is worth noting that Snow violated the statute
the instant he cohabited with more than one woman. The statute is silent
with respect to what act or acts one must commit in order to cohabit with
another. However, assuming one must "live with" another (definitional
issues aside) in order to cohabit, the statute is also silent with respect to
how long one must live with another in order to constitute cohabitation. 8
In other words, there is no temporal definition of cohabitation.
According to the Court, "[t]he offence of cohabitation, in the sense of
this statute, is committed if there is a living or dwelling together as
husband and wife. It is, inherently, a continuous offence, having
duration; and not an offence consisting of an isolated act."'9 Thus, "in
each indictment, the offence is laid as a continuing one, and a single one,
for all the time covered by the indictment; and, taking the three
indictments together, there is charged a continuing offence for the entire
time covered by all three of the indictments."" Because neither the
prosecutor nor the grand jury had the authority to "divide a single
continuous offence... into such parts as it may please, and call each
part a separate offence,"2' the Court held that only one conviction could
be sustained.' The Snow Court, like the Crepps Court, looked not to
whether the Legislature possessed the authority to divide continuous acts
into discrete segments, but to whether it had exercised such power.
B. Current Application
The rule of lenity was given its name and applied by the Supreme
Court in Bell v. United States." In Bell, the defendant pleaded guilty to
violations of the Mann Act24 alleged in two counts. The Mann Act, at
the time of the alleged violation(s), read as follows: "Whoever
December 1, 1885. The grand jury was presented with these allegations on December 2,
1885 and returned three true bills on December 5, 1885. See id. at 276-77.
18. Notice further that the statute proscribes living with more than one woman.
Hence, a male could live with two women or a 100-woman harem and violate the statute
an equal number of times--once. Thus, the rule of lenity could have been applied had
the government attempted to prosecute Snow for each cohabitant, as opposed to the
arbitrary time periods chosen.
19. Snow, 120 U.S. at 281.
20. Id. at 281-82.
21. Id. at 286.
22. See id. at 282.
23. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1986) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994)).
knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce... any woman
or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other
immoral purpose... [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both."'
Bell argued that although he had transported two women, they were
transported during the same trip. Since the statute proscribed
transporting any woman (as opposed to, say, a, one, or each woman), he
could violate the statute only once per trip, irrespective of the number of
women transported. 6 The Supreme Court agreed with Bell, at least to
the extent that his interpretation was plausible. Because the statute was
open to more than one plausible interpretation, the Court held that the
statute's unit of prosecution was unclear. Indeed, "[t]he punishment
appropriate for the diverse federal offenses is a matter for the discretion
of Congress, subject only to constitutional limitations, more particularly
the Eighth Amendment."27 However, "[w]hen Congress leaves to the
Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity."' According to the
Court, "[i]t may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to
resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition
of a harsher punishment." 9 Hence, the rule of lenity, as articulated in
Bell, may be stated as follows: "[I]f Congress does not fix the
punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt
will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple
offenses ..... 30 Stated differently, a court will presume that a
legislature meant for a single continuing transaction to be punished only
once unless there is clear and unambiguous legislative intent to the
contrary."
25. Id. The Mann Act has since been amended to read as follows: "Whoever
knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce.., with intent
that such individual engage in prostitution... shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994).
26. See Bell, 349 U.S. at 82.
27. Id. See infra Parts IV-V for a discussion of the Eighth Amendment's
relevance in unit of prosecution cases.
28. Bell, 349 U.S. at 83.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 84; see also United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221-22 (1952) ("[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to
require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.").
31. There are built-in assumptions which need to be recognized. Strictly speaking,
the rule of lenity is generally regarded as a canon of construction. Whether it is also a
constitutional guarantee is the subject of debate. Compare Comment, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 316 (1965) ("The rule of lenity is not a casual presumption
about legislative intent, but a constitutionally compelled canon of construction."), with
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Cr. REV. 345, 348
200
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The rule of lenity has been invoked by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions after Bell32 and, given the fact that it has now
("It is much easier to understand the current lenity debate once the rule is conceived of as
a nondelegation doctrine."). There is authority to the effect that it is a Double Jeopardy
protection disguised in canonical clothing. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.
684, 688-89, 695 and n.10 (1980). For reasons that will be discussed in Part Ill,
however, this is a potentially confusing, as well as a constitutionally tenuous, conclusion
to draw.
Alternatively, the rule might fit within the Due Process framework. The Court has
itself hinted at this proposition. For example, the Court has stated that the practice of
resolving ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of lenity "reflects not merely a convenient
maxim of statutory construction. Rather, it is rooted in fundamental principles of due
process which mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment,
whether his conduct is prohibited." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979).
Lastly, the rule of lenity has been defended on separation of powers principles. See,
e.g., Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 ("If a federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing
multiple punishments not authorized by Congress, it violates not only the specific
guarantee against double jeopardy, but also the constitutional principle of separation of
powers in a manner that trenches particularly harshly on individual liberty."); see also
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 n.5 (1997); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S.
398, 410 (1980) ("[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of
powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially
decreeing what accords with common sense and the public weal.").
Whatever the case may be, the rule is not constitutionally binding on state courts
unless it is tethered to a constitutional principle. The whole issue may be academic,
however, because state courts, as a general matter, appear eager to invoke the rule. See,
e.g., Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV.
748, 751-52 (1935); cf. Kahan, supra, at 384 (advocating that, even more so than federal
courts, state courts, at least traditionally, have applied the rule of lenity).
With the following assumptions recognized, this Comment will assume that the rule of
lenity is applied in a roughly parallel manner in both federal and state courts.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Bifulco v. United States,
447 U.S. 381 (1980); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990); Hughey v. United
States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990); United
States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
Because there is no occasion to invoke the rule of lenity unless a statute is ambiguous,
there has been debate concerning how a court should decide whether a statute is
ambiguous. Some have advocated a plain meaning approach, whereby courts should
look only to the words of the statute itself. Others have advocated resorting to legislative
history prior to deeming a statute ambiguous. Compare, e.g., R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 307-12
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (advocating a plain meaning approach), and Sarah Newland, The Mercy of
Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197
(applauding the plain meaning approach), with R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 298-306 (Souter, J.,
Rehnquist, J., White, J., and Stevens, J., plurality) (advocating an examination of a
statute's legislative history prior to deciding that a statute is ambiguous for rule of lenity
purposes).
Both approaches are based on sound public policy principles. On the one hand, the
plain meaning approach comports with the notion that statutes are to give notice of what
is proscribed. Indeed, it is a legal fiction to assume that citizens read statute books to
achieved the status of "venerable," 3 it is worth taking a brief look at the
post-Bell development of the rule. For example, in United States v.
Bass," the Supreme Court took a rather mechanical approach in deeming
a federal statute to be ambiguous. Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provided, inter alia, that
[a]ny person who (1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or
of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony... and who receives,
possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce.., any firearm
shall be__ed not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both.
Bass, who had previously been convicted of a felony in New York,
was charged with and convicted of possessing two firearms in violation
of the statute.36 The state, in convicting Bass, did not show that the
firearms had been possessed in commerce or in such a manner so as to
affect commerce. The dispositive issue, therefore, was whether the
phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce" applied to "receives" and
"possesses," in addition to applying to "transports."38 After reiterating
discern what constitutes permissible behavior. This legal fiction, however, is necessary
in order to preclude citizens from claiming ignorance of the law as a legally recognized
excuse for violating it. However, "necessary fiction descends to needless farce when the
public is charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports." R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 309
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In other words, if it is a
stretch to assume that citizens read the statute books prior to acting, then it is
preposterous to assume that citizens read, absorb, and interpret "correctly" all of the
legislative history behind all of the statutes they are assumed to have read.
On the other hand, reviewing the legislative history prior to deciding that a statute is
ambiguous allows a court to determine the purpose of the statute. Discerning legislative
purpose, in turn, prevents courts from taking an unduly restrictive view of criminal
statutes. This broader construction "may be permissible on the basis of nontextual
factors that make clear the legislative intent where it is within the fair meaning of the
statutory language." R.LC., 503 U.S. at 306 n.6 (Souter, J., plurality) (citing Dixson v.
United States, 465 U.S. 482,500-501 n.19 (1984)).
In any event, the practical impact is probably minimal because "the need for fair
warning will make it 'rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a
construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted by the text."' R.L.C., 503
U.S. at 306 n.6 (Souter, J., plurality) (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,
160 (1990)). It suffices for present analysis to be cognizant of the competing schools of
thought.
33. R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 305 (Souter, J., plurality).
34. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
35. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1968), recodified as amended by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)
(1994).
36. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 337-38.
37. See id. at 338.
38. See id. at 339. One wonders whether the federal Legislature would have the
constitutional authority to pass a statute which proscribed mere possession without an
interstate commerce hook, especially in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567 (1995), where the Court held that the possession of a gun is in no sense an economic
activity that might affect any sort of interstate commerce. In any event, the Court never
addressed this constitutional issue because it deemed the clause "in commerce or
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the rule that ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should
be resolved in favor of lenity,39 the Court declared that the statute was
ambiguous because Congress had not "plainly and unmistakably" made
it a federal crime for a convicted felon simply to possess a gun absent• . 40
some demonstrated nexus with interstate commerce.
In Bifulco v. United States,41 the Court reiterated its "clear" precedent
that the rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the
substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they
impose.4 2 As such, the Court articulated its unwillingness to "interpret a
federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an
individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a
guess as to what Congress intended."
43
Thus, the Bell-Bass-Bifulco line of cases refines the rule of lenity such
that its current status may be articulated as follows. First, legislatures
must "plainly and unmistakably" define what is proscribed2 Second,
legislatures must "clearly and without ambiguity" intend to turn a single
transaction into multiple offenses: otherwise, a court will resolve the unit
of prosecution question in favor of one offense.45 Third, because the rule
of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of
criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose, courts will
not increase the penalty a statute visits upon an individual if it must
guess as to what a legislature intended.4' This is the conceptual scheme
upon which subsequent analysis will be based.47
affecting commerce" to modify all three activities-receives, possesses, and transports.
Thus, the Court treated the clause as a constitutionally benign grouping of words.
39. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812
(1971)).
40. See id. at 348-49.
41. 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
42. See id. at 387 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979);
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 (1978)).
43. Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387 (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178
(1958)).
44. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348-49.
45. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955).
46. See Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
47. The rule of lenity intuitively seems fair, perhaps because its rationale is
consistent with other facets of American law. For example, the RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS provides that "[i]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against
the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 206 (1979) (emphasis added). The rationale
for such a rule is as follows:
Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to provide more
carefully for the protection of his own interests than for those of the other
party. He is also more likely than the other party to have reason to know of
uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may leave meaning deliberately obscure,
intending to decide at a later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt,
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, there is substantial reason
for preferring the meaning of the other party. The rule is often invoked in
cases of standardized contracts and in cases where the drafting party has the
stronger bargaining position, but it is not limited to such cases. It is in
strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes called construction, as well as
interpretation: its operation depends on the positions of the parties as they
appear in litigation ....
Id. cmt. a (emphasis added).
Likewise, The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Collectively, these two Due Process clauses guarantee that neither the federal nor a state
government, respectively, may constitutionally require citizens to "answer charges based
upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of
different constructions." Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926).
In Connally, Oklahoma law provided that a contractor pay his employees "not less
than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed .... "
Id. at 388. The Court held the statute was unconstitutionally vague in two respects.
First, the words "current rate of wages" did not denote a specific or definite sum. Id. at
393-94. Second, while the term "locality" might be definite enough in certain
circumstances, it is not so "in a statute such as that under review imposing criminal
penalties." Id. at 394-95.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine articulated in Connally was affirmed in Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), where the Court was asked to determine whether a
California anti-loitering statute was unconstitutionally indefinite. The statute required a
person who loitered or wandered about without apparent reason to identify himself and
to account for his presence when requested to do so by a peace officer. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 647(e) (West 1977). A California Court of Appeal, in People v. Solomon, 108
Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973), had interpreted the statute to mean that an individual must provide
"credible and reliable" identification when requested by a police officer who has
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a detention authorized by
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "Credible and reliable" identification, so said the
California court, is identification "carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is
authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has
identified himself." Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute, holding that the statute "encourages
arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect
must do in order to satisfy the statute." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361. The state had argued
that the need for strengthened law enforcement tools was necessary to combat the crime
epidemic that was plaguing our Nation. The Court poignantly replied that the
compelling societal interest in curbing criminal activity "cannot justify legislation that
would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity." Id.
(citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
The canon of construction which favors interpreting contracts against the drafter and
the void-for-vagueness doctrine have been discussed in conjunction with the rule of
lenity in order to illustrate a common theme in American law. It is assumed that drafters,
whether drafting a contract or a statute, will take care to effectuate their own interests,
perhaps even at the expense of the other party. In other words, the drafting party will not"short-change" itself. Hence, an ambiguous contractual term should not be interpreted in
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III. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AND UNIT OF
PROSECUTION ANALYSIS
A. The History of Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence
The concept of putting an individual in jeopardy only once for one
offense is rooted in ancient common law.48 Indeed, the principle of
double jeopardy existed in Greek and Roman law and it found
expression in the Digest of Justinian.49 Double jeopardy in its modem
form, however, was influenced most heavily by Coke and Blackstone."
The clause, unlike the Eighth Amendment, has neither a Magna Carta
nor an English Bill of Rights ancestor.5 ' Nevertheless, Coke's First
Institute, which might fairly be classified as the beginning of modem
double jeopardy jurisprudence, states:
the draftsman's favor because the drafter had an opportunity to draft the contract as later
desired and, so the argument goes, would have drafted it as later desired if that was his
original intent. This argument applies with equal force with respect to legislatures
because a legislature presumably takes care to effectuate its (or, perhaps more accurately,
its constituents') interests.
There is a second, and somewhat related, reason for construing both contracts and
statutes against the drafter. Even if the "looking-out-for-one's-own-interest" argument is
less than convincing, there is yet a more intuitive reason for reaching the same
conclusion. Contracts are normally drafted and agreed to by private parties. Statutes, on
the other hand, are drafted by legislators, many of whom are attorneys. If private, and
sometimes unsophisticated, parties are responsible for drafting unambiguous contracts,
then legislatures should be held to a higher standard than the private party drafting a
contract, considering the resources available to them and the fact that they are
"predominantly a lawyer's body." Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981)
(quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,594 (1961)).
Finally, one must consider the consequences of interpreting ambiguity in favor of the
drafter. Within the contract realm, an incorrect interpretation may lead to an unjust
allocation of resources (i.e., one party may unfairly be required to pay another party
money damages). An incorrect interpretation of a criminal statute, however, can have
dire consequences. Within the void-for-vagueness realm, an individual may be held
criminally liable for the violation of a statute that a reasonable person could not interpret.
As for the rule of lenity, a defendant may be convicted of numerous violations of a
statute which she reasonably thought she had violated only once. Indeed, "[t]he
standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending
primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
515 (1948).
48. See Comment, supra note 31, at 262 & n.l.
49. See JAY A. SIGLER, DOuBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND
SociAL Po icY 2 (1980) (citation omitted).
50. See id. at 16.
51. See id. at 4.
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Fine, finis, signifieth a pecuniary punishment for an offence or contempt
committed against the king, and regularly to it imprisonment appertaineth. And
it is calledfinis, because it is an end for that offence. And in this case a man is
saidfacerefinem de transgressioe, &c. cum rege, to make an end or fine with
the king for such a transgression.
Likewise, Blackstone observed that the plea of former acquittal is
grounded in the universal maxim of the common law of England, "that
no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the
same offence."53 Therefore, "when a man is once fairly found not guilty
upon any indictment, or other prosecution, he may plead such acquittal
in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime."' '  Similarly, a
plea of former conviction "for the same identical crime... is a good
plea in bar to an indictment" and is based on the same principle "that no
man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the same
crime." However, Blackstone carefully included the caveat that the
pleas of "a former acquittal, and former conviction, must be upon a
prosecution for the same identical act and crime."56
B. The Adoption of the Fifth Amendment
Although double jeopardy had been a part of English common law for
centuries, the principle evolved dramatically with the adoption of the
federal Constitution.57 On June 8, 1789, almost two years after
ratification of the Constitution, James Madison presented to the First
House of Representatives a series of proposed amendments to the
Constitution. Among these proposals was a provision that "[n]o person
shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment or one trial for the same offence."58 After minor alteration
within the House, the House Resolution stated that "[n]o person shall be
subject, except in case of impeachment, to more than one trial, or one
52. 3 J.H. THOMAS, A SYSTEMATIc ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ON THE PLAN OF SIR MATrHEW HALE'S ANALYSIS
443 (1836).
53. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *329.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *330.
56. Id. (emphasis added). At common law, the double jeopardy pleas were prior
acquittal and prior conviction, or autrefois (on a prior occasion) acquit de memefelonie
(the exact same crime) and autrefois convict de meme felonie, respectively. See id. at
329-30; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L..
1807, 1813-14 (1997); Comment, supra note 31, at 262 n.1.
57. See SIGLER, supra note 49, at 28.
58. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 427-28 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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punishment for the same offence .... , The Senate Resolution, after
making substantial alterations to the House version, provided: "nor shall
any person be sub ect for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb...." The provision which was submitted to and ratified
by the state conventions tracked verbatim the Senate Resolution. 6  Thus,
the Fifth Amendment, in its final state, provides: "nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb... ,,"62 The Double Jeopardy Clause has since been made
applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. Application of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The language of the Double Jeopardy Clause that raises unit of
prosecution issues is the scope of the phrase "same offence." " In the
interest of clarity, however, it is perhaps helpful to address briefly the
Double Jeopardy Clause issues that do not have unit of prosecution
implications. First, there has been considerable debate concerning when
a person is "put in jeopardy." The current school of thought seems to be
that jeopardy attaches when a jury has been impaneled and sworn."
59. Legislative Journal, House Pamphlet, Record Group 46 (Aug. 24, 1789),
reprinted in THE COwLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 300 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter
BILL OF RIGHTS].
60. Legislative Journal, Senate Pamphlet, Record Group 46 (Sept. 9, 1789),
reprinted in BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 303.
61. See 1 Stat. 21 (1789), reprinted in BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 308.
62. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
63. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,787 (1969).
64. The vast majority of criminal offenses have been codified. However, the state
of Michigan, for example, in its crusade to convict Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the so-called
"Dr. Death," attempted to try him under a common law ban on assisted suicide. See,
e.g., Kevin Lynch, Marlinga Asks Ruling from Court on Assisted Suicide, DET. NEVS,
Dec. 18, 1997, at D5. If ignorance of the law is no excuse for violating it, then requiring
individuals to know not only the provisions of their state and federal penal codes, but
also the provisions of common law offenses would seem to be a lofty ambition for the
average layperson. In the words of Justice Holmes, "a fair warning should be given to
the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should
be clear." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (emphasis added).
However, rather than dwell on the wisdom of such a practice, this Comment will assume
that the word "offense" refers to a statutory offense.
65. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). For an interesting discussion concerning how to
improve upon this rule, see Amar, supra note 56, at 1840-48. The general rule of when
jeopardy attaches is subject to certain exceptions caused by "manifest necessity." These
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Second, there has been some discussion concerning what exactly is
meant by being placed in jeopardy of "life or limb." Indeed, this now
metaphoric phrase was historically a much more literal protection. In
fact, historically, England generally punished those who committed
serious crimes with capital punishment or loss of appendage.6' However,
the phrase "life or limb" now encompasses all criminal cases,
irrespective of whether the criminal defendant's life or limbs are at
stake.67
Having addressed when an individual is "put in jeopardy" and what is
meant by "life or limb," the following question remains unanswered:
What is "the same offense".r One might assume truistically and,
exceptions include, inter alia, a hung jury, absence of witnesses for certain reasons, and
various other emergencies or unusual circumstances. See SIGLER, supra note 49, at 43-
44.
66. See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53.
67. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873). One might wonder precisely
what constitutes a crime for Double Jeopardy purposes. This issue arises when, for
example, a corporation is forced to pay punitive fines labeled "civil." Cf. Sanford N.
Greenberg, Who Says it's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1996). It is
assumed that all of the cases discussed in this Comment involve criminal, as opposed to
civil, liability.
68. For purposes of discussion, the term "transaction" shall be used to describe the
various behaviors performed by an actor, wholly divorced from legal implications. The
term "offense," by contrast, shall be used to describe the various behaviors and attendant
circumstances which, when combined in a given transaction, constitute a legally
punishable quorum of acts. The immense confusion surrounding Double Jeopardy
jurisprudence, it is submitted, is due in no small part to this often unrecognized
distinction.
In a similar vein, confusion seems to stem from the fact that some, but not all, crimes
are intuitive (mala in se, if you will), and some parts of a crime are intuitive while other
parts are not. For example, the unjustified taking of a human being's life by another
human being, at least at an abstract level, is intuitively objectionable to most persons.
The transaction includes the premature ending of another's life. The problem in
translating this amorphous intuition into a legally recognized quorum of behaviors,
however, is that as abstract thought is crystallized into an applicable offense, the
intuitiveness of what is morally objectionable lessens. Divorced from legal elements and
in the lay parlance, one might ask, 'What other variables should go with the dead body
in order to constitute a crime?" Put another way, "Which behaviors and attendant
circumstances in a given transaction should be included in the definition of the offense?"
Suppose, for example, that person X, a Glauconian, is a state law enforcement agent.
Person Z, a Sophist, unjustifiably kills X not only because he dislikes him personally, but
also because Z is a bigoted, Glauconian-hating, law enforcement-hating individual. Most
would agree that the unjustified and premature ending of X's life by Z is morally
objectionable. Perhaps a sizable group would also deem it worthy of additional
condemnation that Z killed X because of his Glauconian ethnicity. Of that group,
perhaps a few find it worthy of yet greater scorn that Z killed X because the latter was a
law enforcement officer. Notice, however, that consensus weakens as each factor is
added.
Indeed, most people would agree that Z did at least one thing wrong. Others would
agree that Z did two things wrong, while still others would agree that Z did three (or
perhaps more) things wrong. When an offense, as legislatively defined, and a "thing"
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perhaps, logically that "the same offense" means the same offense."
One would be wrong, however, to assume as much, at least according to
the Supreme Court's definition of the same offense. Indeed, the phrase
"the same offense" is "deceptively simple in appearance but virtually
kaleidoscopic in application." '7  Simply put, "the same offense"
generally means the same offense, as well as some similar offenses.1
1. Blockburger v. United States
Blockburger v. United StateP2 is the landmark decision with respect to
the notion that the definition of the same offense is not necessarily self-
evident. Blockburger was charged with and convicted of two counts of
selling morphine hydrochloride to an individual on consecutive days
73
The statute proscribed the sale, inter alia, of morphine not in its original
stamped package.74 Blockburger was additionally charged with and
convicted of one count of selling morphine to an individual not in
pursuance of a written order of the purchaser.75 Blockburger raised two
Double Jeopardy claims. First, the two sales of the unstamped morphine
on consecutive days were to the same person and were temporally
proximate. Therefore, the sales should be considered a single continuing
are roughly parallel, as they were in English common law, few are tempted to invoke the
Double Jeopardy Clause. However, when there are two or three offenses, as defined
legislatively, and only one bad thing, the temptation to invoke the Double Jeopardy
clause becomes difficult, if not impossible, to resist.
69. Professor Amar has advocated this approach persuasively and in no uncertain
terms. "When we consider the entire text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and its history,
a same-means-same approach makes perfect sense." Amar, supra note 56, at 1814.
70. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. These similar offenses that are deemed to be the same offense for Double
Jeopardy purposes do not include offenses between two sovereigns. This is true in all of
the following scenarios: (1) a state trial followed by a federal trial (i.e., the Stacey Koon
and Laurence Powell trials for the April 17, 1993 beating of Rodney King); (2) a federal
trial followed by a state trial (i.e., Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, should
Oklahoma decide to prosecute under state law); and (3) a trial in state X for the violation
of an X statute followed by a trial in state Y for the violation of a Y statute. See, e.g.,
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (upholding convictions in two different states for
the same murder); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (upholding both state and
federal prosecutions for the same "act"). This is the so-called dual sovereignty doctrine.
See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathon L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After
Rodney King, 95 COLum. L. REv. 1 (1995).
72. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
73. See id. at 300-01.
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 692 (1926), recodified as amended by 21 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
75. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300-01. The written order requirement was a
product of 26 U.S.C. § 696 (1914), recodified as amended by 21 U.S.C. § 828 (1970).
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offense.76 Second, the latter sale of unstamped morphine was the same
act upon which his conviction for selling morphine without a written
order was based. Because there was but one act, so goes the argument,
there can be but one offense. 77
The Court rejected both of these claims. As for the temporally
proximate sales, the Court stated that "although made to the same
person, [the sales] were distinct and separate sales made at different
times."'78 In distinguishing between a continuing offense and separate
offenses, the Court pointed out that "[tihe Narcotic Act does not create
the offense of engaging in the business of selling the forbidden drugs
[which presumably would be a continuing offense], but penalizes any
sale made in the absence of [a stamp]." '79 Thus, there was no Double
Jeopardy problem with two convictions based on two acts, however
temporally proximate, when the statute proscribed each act.' °
The Court likewise rejected the "same act equals one offense"
argument." If the Court had merely held that violating two statutes with
one act does not offend Double Jeopardy, then the quip that "the same
offense" means "the same offense" might currently be a valid
interpretation of Double Jeopardy jurisprudence. However, the Court
went on to articulate a rule which will perhaps forever haunt Double
Jeopardy law. "The applicable rule is that where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not."82 Thus, lesser-included offenses are "the same offense" as the
greater offense for Double Jeopardy purposes.83 For example, if statute
76. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301-02.
77. See id. at 303-04.
78. Id. at 301.
79. Id. at 302.
80. This seems intuitively correct and is simple enough to conceptualize. The case
of State v. Rambert, 459 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. 1995), though not a Supreme Court case, is an
excellent example of discrete acts in temporal proximity to one another. In Rambert, the
defendant, who was a passenger in a vehicle, pulled into a parking space next to an
individual who was sitting in the driver's seat of his own vehicle. Rambert produced a
gun and fired a shot at the individual. As the individual started to drive forward,
Rambert fired a second shot at him. Rambert then pursued the individual and fired a
third shot at him. Rambert was convicted of three counts of unlawfully discharging a
firearm. See id. at 512-13.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that Rambert's firearm discharges in rapid
succession, while in a sense a continuous transaction, were nonetheless separate and
distinct acts. See id. at 512. Because these distinct acts were separate statutory
violations, Rambert was never put in jeopardy twice for "the same offense" and, hence,
there was no Double Jeopardy violation. See id. at 513.
81. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
82. Id. (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,342 (1911)).
83. To make matters worse, the Court has held that the doctrine of collateral
210
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X requires proving elements A, B, and C, and statute Y requires proving
elements A, B, C, and D, then an individual who violates both of these
statutes could only be tried for one of the violations because these
statutes are "the same offense." This is so because each provision does
not require proof of an additional fact which the other does not require.
2. Brown v. Ohio
Indeed, this hypothetical was borne out in Brown v. Ohio." Nathaniel
Brown stole an automobile from a parking lot and was caught driving
the automobile some nine days later." Brown was charged with and
pleaded guilty to the offense of joyriding, which was defined as the
taking or operating of another's automobile without his or her consent. 6
After Brown's release from jail, he was indicted in another county for
motor vehicle theft, a charge to which he pleaded guilty. Since the
only difference between the two statutes was the duration of time which
the offender intended to deprive the owner of possession," the issue
before the Court was whether these two violations were "the same
offense" for Double Jeopardy purposes. 9
The Court, applying the Blockburger test, held that the Double
estoppel, at least within the criminal context, is grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. See Ashe v. Swensen, 397 U.S. 436, 437-47 (1970). Collateral
estoppel, however, would seem to fit nicely under a Due Process protection, especially if
it is intended to "protect[] a man who has been acquitted from having to 'ran the gantlet'
a second time." Id. at 446 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)).
See Amar, supra note 56, at 1829 ("[A]s a matter of due process, once a defendant has
prevailed in a criminal case on a certain factual issue, he need not prove it all over again
in a subsequent criminal case."). The correct doctrinal underpinnings of the concept of
collateral estoppel need not be sorted out for present purposes, however, because it is
assumed that neither collateral estoppel nor mandatory joinder principles will interfere
with the analysis. In other words, it is assumed for analytical purposes that all possible
charges are being tried at the same time.
84. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
85. See id. at 162.
86. The statute provided: "No person shall purposely take, operate, or keep any
motor vehicle without the consent of its owner." OFIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(D)
(Anderson 1973) (repealed 1974).
87. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 162-63. The theft statute provided: "No person shall
steal any motor vehicle." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(A) (Baldwin 1973),
recodified as amended by Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2918.03 (Baldwin 1974). Two
counties, unlike a state government and the federal government, are not considered dual
sovereigns for Double Jeopardy purposes because the two counties are both creatures of
the same state.
88. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 163-64.
89. See id. at 164.
Jeopardy Clause "forbids successive prosecution and cumulative
punishment for a greater and lesser included offense."' Additionally,
the Court provided language which is relevant for temporal unit of
prosecution analysis. An Ohio court of appeals had held that, although
joyriding and auto theft were the same offense for Double Jeopardy
purposes, the two offenses were nonetheless different because the two
counties had alleged violations on different dates-the joyriding
allegation on the date of apprehension and the auto theft allegation on
the date of the theft.91 The Court stated that "[tihe Double Jeopardy
Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its
limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a
series of temporal or spatial units."92 Since the statutorily proscribed
conduct was the unauthorized taldng of the vehicle, and not the daily
deprivation of the owner's possession, the continuous offense could not
be individuated temporally by a prosecutor. Indeed, without protection
from arbitrary units of prosecution defined solely by the prosecutor's
office,
[a] prosecutor, by carving up what is essentially one criminal transaction
into a great number of offenses, may prosecute a person until the statute of
limitations has run its course. This is true even though each trial may result in
an acquittal and the only reason for the cumulative prosecutions is the
prosecutor's subjective evaluation of the guilt of the individual. This possibility
leaves the door open to vexatious litigation with its consequential nervous strain
upon the miVP and body of the individual as well as the inevitable drain upon
his finances.
However, the situation in Brown would have been quite different "if
the Ohio Legislature had provided that joyriding is a separate offense for
each day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner's
consent."' This is so because "the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no
limits on how the legislature may carve up conduct into discrete legal
offense units."95 In sum, legislatures, and not prosecutors, establish and
define temporal units of prosecution and the issue of whether a particular
course of conduct (i.e., transaction) involves one or more distinct
offenses under a statute depends solely upon legislative, and not
prosecutorial, choice.96
90. Id. at 169.
91. See id.
92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. SIGLER, supra note 49, at 163 (quoting Robert E. Knowlton, Criminal Law and
Procedure, 11 RuTGERs L. REv. 71, 94 (1957)).
94. SIGLER, supra note 49, at 169 n.8 (citation omitted).
95. Amar, supra note 56, at 1818 (footnote omitted).
96. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1978).
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D. The Double Jeopardy Clause and Temporal Units of Prosecution
Double Jeopardy jurisprudence is fraught with confusion and no
attempt will be made to disentangle the "Gordian knot."9 Suffice it to
say for present purposes that the Court, for better or for worse, still
adheres to the basic tenet articulated in Blockburger. two offenses are
the same offense for Double Jeopardy purposes if each offense does not
require proof of an additional fact which the other offense does not
require.9 However, irrespective of whether "the same offense" means
the same offense, the analysis for temporal units of prosecution is the
same.
For example, assume statute X provides that it shall be a separate
offense for each day" the statute is violated and person Y violates the
statute on days A and B through some continuous act. Can the
continuous act of person Y be individuated temporally when the
temporal unit of prosecution bears no logical relationship to the act?
This question highlights the distinction between a criminal offense and
intuitively objectionable behavior.' °°  For reasons which will be
explained momentarily, there are two offenses for Double Jeopardy
purposes, even though our amorphous intuition may be telling us that Y
did only one thing wrong. And herein lies the root of the tension
between an offense and our own intuitive notions of what is morally
objectionable. The problem, however, with attempting to invoke the
Double Jeopardy Clause in this context is that "[w]ith respect to unit-of-
prosecution cases, the argument assumes that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is capable of reducing the concept of a criminal offense to its
97. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 702 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Historically, the Court has struggled immensely with the proper scope and application of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. In fact, the Court has changed course a couple of times
within recent years and a broad generalization is difficult to articulate. See United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992); Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
98. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). For recent
favorable treatment of the Blockburger test, see Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
107-12 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 370 (1997); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996) (unanimous
Court).
99. A daily unit of prosecution has been chosen for no particular reason. The units
of prosecution, for analytical purposes, could be consecutive hours, days, weeks, months,
years, or any other arbitrarily-defined time periods.
100. For a more thorough explanation of this distinction, see discussion supra note
68.
smallest rational unit, or atom, beyond which further fragmentation
cannot occur without creating a 'doubling effect."'' ' 1 However, "[t]he
difficulty with this assumption is that the size of any unit of prosecution
depends on the legislature's purpose in making it an offense, and
purposes of punishment are notoriously diverse."'"
Hence, the Double Jeopardy Clause poses no obstacle to individuating
temporally a criminal unit of prosecution, and this is true irrespective of
how "the same offense" is defined. For starters, Blockburger would
pose no Double Jeopardy obstacle. This is true because each offense
would require proof of a fact which the other offense would not require.
Specifically, one offense would require proof that person Y violated
statute X on day A: the other offense would require proof that person Y
violated statute X on day B."°3 Similarly, a "same offense means same
offense" approach would treat the two violations as separate offenses.
Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment should
impose no limitation on a legislature's definition of an offense,
regardless of whether the Court incorporates "by reference whatever the
legislature defines as an 'offense' for punishment purposes""0 4 or, more
likely, applies the traditional Blockburger analysis.
IV. THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE AND UNIT OF
PROSECUTION ANALYSIS
Experience shows that in countries remarkable for the lenity of their laws
the spirit of the inhabitants is as much affected by slight penalties as in other
countries by severer punishments.
It is an essential point that there should be a certain proportion in
punishments, because it is essential that a great crime should be avoided rather
than a smaller, and that which is more pernicious to society rather than that
which is less.
101. Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. Rv. 81, 113.
102. Id. (footnote omitted).
103. In a purely technical sense, it is not entirely clear whether the Court would
extend the Blockburger test to multiple violations of the same statute. The exact
language of the test states that it applies when the same act violates "two distinct
statutory provisions." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added). However,
because the test was designed to discern when legislatures intend to create separately
punishable offenses, and because it is self-evident that a legislature intends separate
offenses when it creates separate units of prosecution, it seems highly unlikely that
Blockburger would, pardon the pun, block treating the offenses as separate.
104. Westen & Drubel, supra note 101, at 112 (footnote omitted).
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It is a great abuse amongst us to condemn to the same punishment a person
that only robs on the highway and another who robs and murders. Surely, for
the public security, some difference should be made in the punishment.
- Montesquieu105
Part II of this Comment discussed the rule of lenity, concluding that
the rule prevents multiple prosecutions for the continuing violation of a
statute when legislative intent to provide for multiple prosecutions is
reasonably unclear. Part HI explored the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, concluding that, within the temporal unit of
prosecution realm, it precludes only multiple prosecutions for the
continuing violation of a statute when the continuing violation is the
proscribed act. These two conclusions leave the following question
unanswered: What, if any, constitutional limits are there on a
legislature's power to punish a defendant by creating multiple units of
prosecution for the continuing violation of a criminal statute? The
primary thrust of this part focuses on whether the Eighth Amendment
merely proscribes certain methods of punishment, as suggested in
Harmelin v. Michigan,'O or whether it also proscribes punishment
disproportionate to the culpable conduct, as articulated in Weems v.
United States'o° and reiterated in Solem v. Helm.,
A. The History of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted,"' ' and has been made applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. ° The Eighth Amendment was lifted
directly from a similar Virginia state guarantee."' George Mason, the
author of the Virginia provision, had, in turn, previously adopted the
105. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUiEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. 6, chs. 12, 16, at 83, 89-
90 (Thomas Nugent trans., Colonial Press 1900).
106. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
107. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
108. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
110. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
111. See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I, § 9 (1776).
language of the English Bill of Rights."12 This raises the following
issues: (1) whether the English Bill of Rights' Cruel and Unusual Clause
encompassed a proportionality limitation; and (2) whether the Framers
drafted the Eighth Amendment intending for it to have a scope similar to
its English predecessor.
1. Proportional Punishment Under English Law
The practice of proscribing physical punishment proportionate to the
culpable conduct has existed in England for centuries."3 English law, as
it existed during the reign of Edward the Confessor, who ruled England
from 1042 through 1066, included the following maxim:
We do forbid that a person shall be condemned to death for a trifling
offence. But for the correction of the multitude, extreme punishment shall be
inflicted according to the nature and extent of the offence. For that ought not
for a trifling matter to be destroyed which God ha ,nade after His own image,
and has redeemed with the price of His own blood.
In 1100, Henry I assumed the throne of England and declared that the
just laws of Edward the Confessor would once again be the laws of
England." 5  Moreover, Henry I declared that "if any one shall be
convicted of treason or other crime, his punishment shall be according to
his fault." 6  Additionally, all murders "committed shall be justly
punished according to the law of King Edward."..
The Magna Carta, signed by King John in 1215, states, inter alia, that
"[a] freeman shall be amerced"' for a small offence only according to
the degree of the offence; and for a grave offence he shall be amerced"9
according to the gravity of the offence. . . ."o Additionally, "[e]arls and
112. 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (1689) (Eng.). The English Bill of Rights was preceded, of
course, by the venerable Magna Carta of 1215.
113. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:"
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 846-47 (1969).
114. LAWS OF EDWARD THE CONFESSOR, reprinted in BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE
MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OFENGLAND 181, 199 (2d ed. 1900). It is
unclear whether Edward enacted these laws or simply agreed to enforce existing custom.
It is also unknown who wrote the document which purports to be the LAWS OF EDWARD
THE CONFESSOR. See id. at 22-25, 181-82.
115. See id. at 77-78.
116. CHARTER OF KING HENRY I, reprinted in BARRINGTON, supra note 114, at 204,
207.
117. Id.
118. An amercement, which is similar in nature to a fine, was assessed by a
delinquent's peers or imposed arbitrarily at the discretion of the court. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 81 (6th ed. 1990).
119. Other translations provide that free men were to be punished for great
delinquencies according to the magnitude of the delinquency. See, e.g., BARRINGTON,
supra note 114, at 235.
120. MAGNA CARTA ch. 20 (1215), reprinted in CARL STEPHENSON & FREDERICK
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barons shall be amerced only by their peers, and only according to the
degree of the misdeed." '' Thus, the concept of proportionality existed
and was fairly entrenched in English law as early as the thirteenth
century. Put differently, "by the year 1400, we have the expression of
'the long standing principle of English law that the punishment should
fit the crime. That is, the punishment should not be, by reason of its
excessive length or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense
charged."' ' 2
The English Bill of Rights of 1689'2' is the direct ancestor of many
rights contained in the Constitution of the United States, including the
Eighth Amendment.'24 If "prior to adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1689
England had developed a common law prohibition against excessive
punishments in any form,"'5 then it remains to be explored what, if any,
impact the English Bill of Rights had on this common law protection. In
William Blackstone's venerable Commentaries on the Laws of England,
written some sixty years after the English Bill of Rights, Blackstone
observed that "whenever any laws direct [the] destruction [of life or
limbs] for light and trivial causes, such laws are... tyrannical,"
notwithstanding the fact that "the subject is aware of the danger he is
exposed to, and may by prudent caution provide against it."'26 Thus,
even with notice sufficient to warn those who break the law, English law
provided that life or limb could not "be wantonly destroyed or disabled
without a manifest breach of civil liberty."' Put differently, "[t]he
statute law of England d[id] therefore very seldom, and the common law
GEORGE MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONsTrTUTIONAL HISTORY 115, 119 (1937).
121. Id. ch. 21. The Magna Carta survived great political unrest. King John, after
being forced to sign the document, immediately attempted to repudiate its validity. It
was subsequently reissued by Henry III in 1216 and 1217 after revision. The Magna
Carta was again reissued by Henry I in 1225 after he had reached adulthood. The 1225
version was the document which subsequent rulers endorsed and ratified. The relevant
language for punishment purposes remained the same. See STEPHENSON & MARCHAM,
supra note 120, at 115 n.1; see generally BARRINGTON, supra note 114.
122. Granucci, supra note 113, at 846 (1969) (quoting RiCHARD L. PERRY, SoURcES
OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (1959)).
123. 1 W. & M., ch. 2 (1689) (Eng.).
124. The exact language, as it reads in the English Bill of Rights, is as follows:
"[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell
and unusuall Punishments inflicted." Id; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 & n.10
(1983); Granucci, supra note 113, at 840-42.
125. Granucci, supra note 113, at 847.
126. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at*129 (emphasis omitted).
127. Id. at *126 (emphasis added).
d[id] never, inflict any punishment extending to life or limb, unless upon
the highest necessity ."28 Citing Sir Matthew Hale, Blackstone
observed that
when offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a kingdom or state,
destructive or highly pernicious to civil societies, and to the great insecurity and
danger of the kingdom or it's [sic] inhabitants, severe punishment and even
death itself2 s necessary to be annexed to laws in many cases by the prudence of
lawgivers.
Hence, it is "the enormity, or dangerous tendency, of the crime, that
alone can warrant any earthly legislature in putting him to death that
commits it"'3 because
[i]t is not it's [sic] frequency only, or the difficulty of otherwise preventing it,
that will excuse our attempting to prevent it by a wanton effusion of human
blood. For, though the end of punishment is to deter men from offending, it
never can follow from thence, that it is lawful to deter them at any rate and by
any means; since & ere may be unlawful methods of enforcing obedience even
to the justest laws.
Moreover, as a matter of public policy, "punishments of unreasonable
severity, especially when indiscriminately inflicted, have less effect in
preventing crimes, and amending the manners of a people, than such as
are more merciful in general, yet properly intermixed with due
distinctions of severity.' 32  Otherwise, "[t]he injured, through
compassion, will often forbear to prosecute: juries, through compassion,
will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the guilty or mitigate
the nature of the offence: and judges, through compassion, will respite
one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal mercy."'33
Based on this historical review, there is ample evidence to suggest that
proportionality in criminal sentencing had been a part of English law for
hundreds of years prior to the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta
encompassed proportionality in explicit terms. The English Bill of
Rights likewise enveloped proportionality, as did English law
subsequent to the passage of the English Bill of Rights. Against this
historical backdrop, let us now turn to the United States Constitution and
analyze whether it likewise offers protection from disproportionately
severe punishment.
128. Id. at *129 (emphasis added).
129. 4 BLAcKsToNE, supra note 53, at *9 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at *9-10 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at *10 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at*16-17.133. Id. at *19.
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2. The Adoption of the Eighth Amendment
As previously mentioned, James Madison presented to the First House
of Representatives a series of proposed amendments to the
Constitution.3 4 Among the proposals was a provision declaring that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."'35 There is little doubt that this
provision, at a minimum, was to provide protection from barbarous
forms of punishment.3 6 However, there is also evidence to support the
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment was intended to provide
protection from disproportionately severe punishment.
In mid-September of 1787, at the height of the ratification debate,
George Mason authored his Objections to This Constitution of
Government,3 7 wherein he lambasted the Constitution's lack of restraint
over the Congress vis-h-vis the states and their citizenry.
Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end of the
enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and
commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punishments, and
extend their powers as far as they shall think proper, so that the State
legislatures have no securqg for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or
the people for their rights.
Not allowing the Antifederalist to go unanswered, James Iredell, an
ardent Federalist, responded to Mason's criticisms thusly:
The expressions "unusual and severe" or "cruel and unusual" surely would
have been too vague to have been of any consequence, since they admit of no
clear and precise signification. If to guard against punishments being too
severe, the Convention had enumerated a vast variety of cruel punishments, and
prohibited the use of any of them, let the number have been ever so great, an
inexhaustible fund must have been unmentioned, and if our government had
been dispose3o be cruel their invention would only have been put to a little
more trouble.
134. See BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 59.
135. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 433 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
136. See Granucci, supra note 113, at 842.
137. See 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 992 (Robert A. Rutland
ed., 1970) [hereinafter THE PAPERS]; PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 331 (Paul L.
Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1968) (1888) [hereinafter PAMPHLETS].
138. 3 THEPAPERS, supra note 137, at 992-93 (emphasis added).
139. JAMES IREDELL, ANswERs TO MR. MASON'S OBJECrIONS TO THE Nav
CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 137, at 360 (emphasis
added).
Iredell also reminded us "that as those who are to make those laws must
themselves be subject to them, their own interest and feelings will
,,1140dictate to them not to make them unnecessarily severe ....
This exchange between Mason and Iredell wherein the terms "severe"
and "cruel" were used interchangeably was no fluke. In June of 1787, a
few months prior to Mason's Objections, James Madison recorded a
Mason speech concerning the federal government's power to tax and its
potential enforcement through its military power. "To punish the non-
payment of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by
despotism itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared
to a military collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no
discrimination between the innocent and the guilty.' '14' Hence, it is clear
that at least some, if not all, individuals, whether Federalist or
Antifederalist, used the terms "severe" and "cruel" interchangeably.
Contemporaneous definitions and usage of the words sustain this
contention. Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary defines cruel, inter
alia, as painful, severe, strict, or rigorous and defines cruel
circumstances as those which are painful, distressing, severe, or hard.1
43
In June of 1788, after the Constitution had been ratified sans a Bill of
Rights, Mason sent a copy of proposed constitutional amendments to
Congress for consideration.'" Among these provisions was a clause
declaring "[t]hat excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
Fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted."'45
Noticeably absent from this list of proposed amendments is a separate
provision assailing the infliction of disproportionately severe
punishment. 46 Which way does this fact cut? It has been observed
recently that "[p]roportionality provisions had been included in several
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. 3 THE PAPERS, supra note 137, at 907 (emphasis added). There are two things
about this passage worth noting. First, Mason used the terms "severe" and "cruel"
synonymously. Second, Mason was troubled by the fact that the military would be
unable to differentiate between those who had paid their taxes and those who had not.
This passage underscores the principle of proportionality because Mason is implicitly
stating that use of "the bayonet" is acceptable against those who are guilty. If, however,
the terms "severe" and "cruel" are only intended to proscribe certain modes of
punishment, then presumably this behavior would have been either objectionable or
acceptable irrespective of the culpability of the taxpayer. See infra Part IV.C for a
detailed discussion of this issue.
142. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE Op KING HENRY THE FIFrH act V,
sc. ii, Ins. 196-97, reprinted in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WoRKS 776
(Alfred Harbage ed., Viking Press 1977) (1599) ("[B]ut, good Kate, mock me
mercifully, the rather, gentle princess, because I love thee cruelly.").
143. See 4 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 78 (2d ed. 1989).
144. See 3 THE PAPERS, supra note 137, at 1068.
145. Id. at 1070.
146. See id. at 1068-71.
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State Constitutions .... There is little doubt that those who framed,
proposed, and ratified the Bill of Rights were aware of such
[proportionality] provisions [in some States' constitutions], yet chose not
to replicate them."147  Thus, so runs the argument, the Federal
Constitution does not encompass a proportionality requirement because
the Framers had an opportunity to articulate such a principle explicitly
and chose otherwise.
It must be conceded that there is a certain amount of intuitive force to
this argument. However, the response is twofold. First, it seems
unlikely that Mason, after complaining vehemently about a lack of
federal protection from unusual and severe punishments, would have
neglected to submit a proposed remedy to this problem. Thus,
protection from unusual and severe punishments presumably can be
found within the text of Mason's proposals. An examination of Mason's
proposals, however, reveals that the "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause is the only proposed provision with respect to punishment. '4s
Hence, Mason must have intended that protection from cruel and
unusual punishments provided protection from severe punishments.
Second, there were many State constitutional provisions of which the
Framers were aware and yet declined to include explicitly. Does this
mean that the omission of an explicit clause is tantamount to an absence
of the omitted clause's principle? This is a doubtful proposition upon
which to base a constitutional claim. For example, Mason's proposals
included a provision that "the legislative executive and judiciary Powers
of Government shou'd be separate & distinct .... 14' The Framers,
however, chose not to include such a provision. Is it to be assumed that
there is no separation of powers principle implicit in the Federal
Constitution? The answer to this rhetorical question-namely, that such
an assumption is incorrect-is perhaps nothing short of self-evident.
Indeed, the Federalists' main objection to a bill of rights was that it
would be superfluous. "[A bill of rights] would contain various
exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very account, would afford
a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.""5 0
Moreover, the body of the Constitution also contains arguably
147. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality) (citation
omitted).
148. See 3 THE PAPERS, supra note 137, at 1068-71.
149. Id. at 1069.
150. THE FEDERALiST No. 84, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
superfluous protections. For example, the Constitution provides that
"[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States ....
This limitation would seem to be redundant, given the fact that the
enumerated powers provide no such power in the first instance.5 2 Thus,
there are constitutional principles that are properly derived from
implication while other principles -are expressly and, arguably,
unnecessarily articulated explicitly. Likewise, given the synonymous
use of the terms "cruel" and "severe" by Mason, Iredell, and others on
both sides of the ratification fence, it is not unreasonable to assume that
protection from severe punishment was understood to be implicit in
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.
In any event, the Congressional debates surrounding the proposed
adoption of a bill of rights were brief and only partially recorded 53 In
fact, the entire recorded discussion of the Eighth Amendment proceeded
as follows:
Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel and unusual
punishments," the import of them being too indefinite.
Mr. Livermore [of New Hampshire].-The clause seems to express a great
deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to
have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms
excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive
fines? It lies with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is
to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve
whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be
prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more
lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it
could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it, but
until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained
from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.
The wNestion was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a considerable
majority.
It is unclear what Smith thought the amendment was designed to
achieve.'" It is clear that Livermore thought, at a minimum, that the
amendment would bar certain modes of punishment. 56 Since the
amendment was agreed to by a "considerable majority," however, it
would be informative to know what the majority thought the amendment
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
153. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 749-56 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
154. Id. at 753.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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was designed to achieve. Since there is no known recording of anyone
else's contemporaneous statements or thoughts, however, the scope of
the amendment's protection is not clarified by Congressional legislative
history."5 8 In fact, it is not even clear whether Smith or Livermore voted
in favor of or against the amendment. In any event, the Bill of Rights
was adopted soon thereafter. However, the Supreme Court had few
opportunities to interpret the Eighth Amendment during the first 100
years or so after its adoption. When the Court was presented with an
Eighth Amendment issue, the issue normally concerned not the scope of
the Eighth Amendment's protections, but whether its protections applied
to state governments. 59
B. Early Application of the Eighth Amendment
1. O'Neil v. Vermont
O'Neil v. Vermont 6° was the first case wherein a Supreme Court
Justice acknowledged a proportionality principal in analyzing Eighth
Amendment issues. John O'Neil was a wholesale and retail liquor
distributor lawfully engaged in said business under the laws of New
York."' However, O'Neil also sold liquor to various individuals in
Vermont, where such sales were prohibited.12 Specifically, a Vermont
157. Discerning legislative intent is a slippery concept and no attempt will be made
to advocate one theory of constitutional interpretation over another. It suffices for
present purposes to acknowledge that the difficulty in discerning legislative intent with
respect to the Eighth Amendment is compounded by the absence of a substantial
Congressional record.
158. There has been a tremendous amount of academic attention devoted to whether
and how extraneous information should be used in determining what a written provision
(i.e., a constitutional clause, a statute, etc.) means. See, e.g., Larry Alexander,
Originalism, or Who is Fred?, 19 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 321 (1996); Antonin Scalia,
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. Ray. 581
(1990); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 263 (1982). No attempt will be made to advocate any
particular method of interpretation other than to look to the words themselves and their
common meanings.
159. See, e.g., McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436 (1890); Eilenbecker v. District Ct., 134 U.S. 31 (1890); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S.
410 (1847); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
160. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
161. See id. at 327.
162. See id.
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statute provided that "[n]o person shall ... manufacture, sell, furnish, or
give away... spirituous or intoxicating liquor... ,,13 Upon a second
conviction, the convicted shall "forfeit for each offense twenty dollars
and costs of prosecution... .""4 Finally, another statutory provision
provided that every distinct act of selling could be prosecuted and, if
proven, the trial court was to impose a fine for each offense."' O'Neil
was charged with and convicted of 307 violations of the statute.'6 He
was subsequently assessed a fine of $6140 (twenty dollars for each of
307 convictions) plus costs, for a total of $6638. In default of payment,
a separate statutory provision provided that the convicted could "work
off" his fine at a rate of one dollar per three days in prison at hard labor,
which equaled 19,914 days (or about 54 years). 67
After losing his appeal before the Supreme Court of Vermont, O'Neil
appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court."" A majority of
the Court flatly held that "the 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States does not apply to the States"'69 and consequently upheld
O'Neil's convictions. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Field
declared that the "punishment imposed was one exceeding in severity,
considering the offences of which the defendant was convicted, anything
which I have been able to find in the records of our courts for the present
century."'70 In fact, this sentence was about six times as great as any
court in Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter.17 1 Thus,
according to Justice Field, O'Neil's punishment "was one which, in its
severity, considering the offences of which he was convicted, may justly
be termed both unusual and cruel."' 72
Justice Field conceded that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
is normally associated with punishment such as the rack, the
thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs, and the like.'73
163. Id. at 325.
164. Id. at 326.
165. See id. Notice that the unit of prosecution is clear. Hence, as has been argued,
neither the rule of lenity nor the Double Jeopardy Clause would preclude the prosecution
from bringing multiple counts. Note also that this was an actual statute and not a
fanciful parking hypothetical with little basis in reality.
166. Originally, O'Neil was convicted of 457 violations of the statute by a justice of
the peace. His punishment was to be $9140 and, in the event that he could not or would
not pay the fine, a prison sentence of 28,836 days (or about 79 years) of hard labor.
O'Neil appealed his conviction to a county court, which allowed the appeal. The case
was subsequently tried de novo in front of a jury. See id. at 326-27.
167. See id. at 331.
168. See id. at331-32.
169. Id. at 332 (citing Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866)).
170. Id. at 338 (Field, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 339.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. See id.
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However, he was of the opinion that the clause prohibits not only
barbarous punishment, but also "all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences
charged."'74 In his opinion, the word "excessive" in the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause modifies every other provision.7 ' In other
words, the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines,
and excessive punishment."' In response to the individuation of the
crime into separate offenses, Justice Field observed that "[it is no matter
that by cumulative offences, for each of which imprisonment may be
lawfully imposed for a short time, the period prescribed by the sentence
was reached, the punishment was greatly beyond anything required by
any humane law for the offences."1"
He then used an example wherein a state prosecuted the consumption
of each drop of alcohol. While the state could lawfully proscribe such
conduct, "it would be an unheard-of cruelty if [the state] should count
the drops in a single glass and make thereby a thousand offences, and
thus extend the punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an
imprisonment of almost indefinite duration. '' 78 In another example,
Justice Field opined that although repulsive to him personally, a criminal• 179
could receive twenty lashes for petty offenses. O'Neil's crime, by
most standards, was petty. However, 6140 lashes would be not only
cruel and unusual, but would cause a "cry of horror" from "every
civilized and Christian community of the country against it."''o
Justice Field's examples and the parldng-in-front-of-the-fire-hydrant
hypothetical discussed in Part I share a common characteristic. Each of
the hypotheticals has a somewhat serious, yet arguably defensible,
punishment for each unit of prosecution. However, when the counts are
combined, the aggregate punishment that results is severe. Hence, "[i]t
does not alter [the punishment's] character as cruel and unusual, that for
each distinct offence there is a small punishment, if, when they are
brought together and one punishment for the whole is inflicted, it
becomes one of excessive severity.' '181 More recently, it has been
174. Id. at 339-40.







observed that "[t]o be sure, it may be possible to hypothesize units of
prosecution that are so fragmented that to punish each separately would
constitute excessive punishment.""' In this case, "the fragmentation
would be invalid because the Eighth Amendment... prohibits the State
from subjecting the defendant to excessive punishment."' s3
2. Weems v. United States
Justice Field's concept of a proportionality principle in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence was first recognized by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Weems v. United States.'14 Weems appealed his case
to the Supreme Court when the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
affirmed his conviction for falsifying an official public document."
Specifically, Weems was convicted of falsifying an official document of
the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States
Government of the Philippine Islands when he entered as paid out
certain wages on behalf of lighthouse employees.' His sentence was
fifteen years of cadena temporal and a fine of 4000 pesatas.'8 Since the
Philippine Islands were not treated as a "state" for selective
incorporation purposes (and, hence, O'Neil v. Vermont did not preclude
application of the Eighth Amendment), the issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment encompasses a proportionality principle in sentencing was
thus squarely before the Court. Justice McKenna, speaking for the
majority, was, like Justice Field in O'Neil, plainly disturbed by the
severity of punishment.
As an initial premise, Justice McKenna observed that the "function of
the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by presumptions of right
and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial
182. Westen & Drubel, supra note 101, at 114.
183. Id. (citation omitted).
184. 217 U.S. 349,380-82 (1910).
185. See id. at 357.
186. Note that a "false entry is all that is necessary to constitute the offense.
Whether an offender.., injures any one by his act or intends to injure any one" is
immaterial. Id. at 363.
187. The punishment of cadena temporal was from twelve years and one day to
twenty years, to be served in a penal institution wherein the convicted labored at the
benefit of the state. The convicted at all times carried a chain at the ankle which hung
from the wrists. They were "employed" at hard and painful labor and received no
outside assistance. Moreover, the convicted were stripped of parental authority,
guardianship of persons and property, marital authority, and the right to conduct inter
vivos transactions of property. They were also subject to government surveillance,
which included a requirement that the convicted ask for government permission to
change domiciles. Lastly, the convicted were absolutely disqualified from holding
public office and voting and lost retirement pay. See id. at 364-65.
[VOL. 36: 195, 1999] Temporal Units
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIENV
conception of [its] wisdom or propriety."'' With this deferential
conceptual scheme in mind, Justice McKenna stated that legislatures
"have no limitation[s] .. . but constitutional ones, and what those are the
judiciary must judge."8 9 In other words, the Court's scope of review had
nothing to do with whether the punishment of cadena temporal was
sound social policy, but whether it was cruel and unusual punishment
and, thus, unconstitutional.'"
The Court held that the punishment was cruel and unusual."' It is
worth noting that the punishment was cruel and unusual, not in the
abstract (like, say, the guillotine or the thumbscrew, which are
presumably always cruel and unusual, irrespective of the gravity of the
offense), but when compared to the offense committed In the
Philippines at the time in question, an individual convicted for the
falsification of bank notes and securities of the United States was
188. Id. at 379.
189. Id.
190. This issue highlights somewhat of a paradox. On the one hand, if the clause is
grounded in the moral judgment of a majority of American society, then the clause
would appear to state a truism (do that which a majority of you would do anyway).
Truisms, one could argue, exist in other areas of our Constitution (the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Tenth Amendment, etc.). Hence, "if the words 'cruel and unusual'
indeed are defined in terms of society's current mores and are subject to change only
when society itself has evolved, then.., the cruel and unusual punishment clause would
appear to serve a merely rhetorical purpose." Joseph L. Hoffmann, The "Cruel and
Unusual Punishment" Clause: A Limit on the Power to Punish or Constitutional
Rhetoric?, in TaE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFIER 200 YEARS 140 (David J.
Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993).
On the other hand, if it is possible to find independent content in the words'cruel and unusual,' that is, content or meaning independent of the current
mores of American society, then the clause would be among the most essential
in the Bill of Rights. This is because the clause would then confer rights upon
perhaps the least valued, and hence most vulnerable, of all minority groups
within society-the class of convicted criminals.
Id.
191. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381-82.
192. Justice Scalia, however, has recently interpreted the Weems decision as lending
support for both propositions. On the one hand, "portions of the [Weems] opinion...
suggest that mere disproportionality, by itself, might make a punishment cruel and
unusual: 'Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who ... believe that it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offence."' Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 991 (1991) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S.
at 366-67). On the other hand, the punishment of cadena temporal violates the Eighth
Amendment because "[ilt has no fellow in American legislation.... It is cruel in its
excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is
unusual in its character." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 991 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 377).
Justice Scalia's point is well taken and will be discussed in more detail infra Part IV.C.3.
sentenced to a maximum of fifteen years.'93 In comparing this statute to
the one under which Weems was convicted, Justice McKenna observed
that "the highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the
loss of many thousand[s] of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the
State should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public
document,"'' is no greater in degree than the punishment which may be
imposed for falsifying a single item of a public account. This
comparison of statutes and punishments is, if anything, a measure of a
penalty's proportionality.'95 Thus, the Weems decision is the first
Supreme Court decision to recognize that the Eighth Amendment
includes protection from punishment disproportionate to the culpable
conduct for which an individual has been convicted.
C. Current Application of Eighth Amendment in
Proportionality Analysis
1. Rummel v. Estelle
In Rummel v. Estelle,'96 William James Rummel was convicted of his
third felony and, thus, fell under a recidivist enhancement statute.'97 The
statute provided that "[w]hoever shall have been three times convicted of
a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned
for life in the penitentiary..' 98 This case would have been unremarkable
but for the fact that all three of Rummel's offenses were relatively minor
in nature.
Rummel was first convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain
eighty dollars worth of goods and services.'" Since the amount was
greater than fifty dollars, Rummel's conviction was a felony, for which
he was sentenced to three years.Y° Rummel's second conviction was for
passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, for which he was
193. The punishment was cadena perpetua, which provided for not more than
fifteen years at hard and painful labor, as well as various trimmings similar to those
included in cadena temporal, See Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81.
194. Id. at 381.
195. The Court has recently extended this concept of comparing statutes and their
punishments. A three-part objective test has been crafted and will be discussed in more
detail infra Part IV.C.2. See Solem v. Helm, 463.U.S. 277,290-92 (1983).
196. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
197. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (West 1925), recodifled as amended by
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West 1994).
198. Id. The revised statute now provides for a punishment of life, or for any term
of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d)
(West 1994).
199. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265.
200. See id.
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sentenced to four years' imprisonment." ' Some four years later,
Rummel was charged with obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.2 The
state proceeded against Rummel under its recidivist statute. Rummel
was convicted and subsequently given the statutory life sentence with
the possibility of parole after twelve years.20 In short, Rummel was
given a life sentence for three convictions based on crimes which netted
a gain of $229.11.2°4
The Court rejected Rummel's Eighth Amendment proportionality
argument. Specifically, the Court held that a mandatory life sentence
imposed upon an individual pursuant to a recidivist statute does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment'05
Justice Rehnquist opined that "the interest of the State of Texas here is
not simply that of making criminal the unlawful acquisition of another
person's property," 2 6 but is "in addition the interest, expressed in all
recidivist statutes, in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by
repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of
conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law."2
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in this case, while perhaps appearing at
first blush to be resistant to the concept of a proportionality principle, is
not conceptually inconsistent with proportionality. Indeed, one of the
primary goals of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders, like most
other criminal statutes. However, at some point the statute has another
goal of segregating the repeat offender from the rest of society.2 1 This
rationale of segregating repeat offenders from the general population
carries little weight within the unit of prosecution analysis. Unlike a
repeat offender, the parking-in-front-of-the-fire-hydrant defendant or the
Weems defendant for that matter has not had an opportunity to go
through the process and "learn her lesson." In fact, all of the charges are
being brought in a single proceeding and not over a ten-year period as in
Rummel. Thus, while Rummel may appear resistant to a proportionality
principle in Eighth Amendment analysis, its rationale for saying
"enough is enough" to repeat offenders is not inconsistent with
201. See id. at 265-66.
202. See id. at 266.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 265-66.
205. See id. at 284-85.
206. Id. at 276.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 284.
importing a limited proportionality requirement in temporal unit of
prosecution cases. In any event, Rummel is significant insofar as it
draws a line in the sand in declaring that "successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been," and presumably will
continue to be, "exceedingly rare."
'
2. Solem v. Helm
Three years after Rummel, the Court decided Solem v. Helm. 210 Jerry
Helm had been convicted of six prior nonviolent felonies in the state of
South Dakota. South Dakota had a recidivist statute, which provided
that a fourth felony conviction carried an enhanced sentence of life
imprisonment.2 2 Helm pleaded guilty to the charge of uttering a no
account check for $100 and was sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.23 After a federal district court denied habeas
corpus relief, an appellate court reversed.214 The Eighth Circuit held that
Helm's sentence of life without parole was unconstitutionally
disproportionate and qualitatively different from Rummel's life
sentence, which carried the possibility of parole.25 This difference, so
said the court, thus made Helm's case distinguishable from Rummel v.
Estelle.
216
The Supreme Court agreed. In an opinion written by Justice Powell,
the Court held that Helm's "sentence [was] significantly
disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.""2 7  The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the
Eighth Amendment, Justice Powell observed, "prohibits not only
barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the
209. Id. at 272.
210. 463 U.S. 277 (1983)..
211. See id. at 279-80. Helm's six prior offenses included: (1) third degree burglary
in 1964; (2) third degree burglary in 1966; (3) third degree burglary in 1969; (4)
obtaining money under false pretenses in 1972; (5) grand larceny in 1973; and (6) a third
conviction for driving while intoxicated in 1975. See id.
212. The actual statute read as follows: "When a defendant has been convicted of at
least three prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the
principal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. CODIED
LAWS § 22-7-8 (Michie 1979) (current version at S.D. CODiFm LAWS § 22-7-8 (Michie
1998)). A separate statute provides that "[a] person sentenced to life imprisonment is not
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. CODMD LAWS § 22-6-
1(3) (Michie Supp. 1982) (current version at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-8 (Michie
1998). Helm's seventh felony conviction was apparently the first committed after
passage of the recidivist statute.
213. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83.
214. See Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982).
215. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 283-84.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
230
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crime committed."218 That being the case, reviewing courts "should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures
necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments
for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in
sentencing convicted criminals., 219 To aid future courts in determining
disproportionate punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes, the Court
articulated a three-part analysis based on objective factors.' First,
courts must "look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty." ' Second, courts should "compare the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction" because "[i]f more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is
some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive."m
Third, "courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."t '' These objective
factors build upon the Weems concept of comparing various statutes and
their punishments. Justice Powell adds to this concept by comparing not
only intrajurisdictional statutes and their punishments, but also by
comparing interjurisdictional statutes and their punishments.2 4
3. Harmelin v. Michigan
Eight years after Solem v. Helm,m the Supreme Court decided
Harmelin v. Michigan.m Ronald Harmelin was, convicted of possessing
672 grams of cocaine and was subsequently sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.m This may seem extreme in and of
itself, but it is perhaps startling when it is revealed that Harmelin had no
218. Id. at 284.
219. Id. at 290.
220. See id. at 290-92.
221. Id. at 290-91 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797-801 (1982)).
222. Id. at 291 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801; Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910)).
223. Id. at 291-92 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 593-97 (1977)).
224. Note that the Court, in invalidating Helms' punishment, concluded that the
sentence visited upon him was significantly disproportionate to the culpable conduct of
which he was convicted. See id. at 303. The degree to which the punishment is
disproportionate to the culpable conduct will become central to the discussion infra Part
IV.D.
225. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
226. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
227. See id. at 961.
prior felony or misdemeanor convictions.m The Court held, however,
that this sentence did not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.29 Thus, after Harmelin, we are left
with the following jurisprudential interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. A sentence of life in prison without parole based on seven
"nonviolent" felony convictions-three burglaries, two convictions for,
in essence, stealing money, one larceny, and a third conviction for
driving while intoxicated-is cruel and unusual punishment. However,
a sentence of life in prison without parole based on one felony
conviction for possession of an illegal substance, and no criminal record,
is not cruel and unusual punishment. At the risk of professing the
obvious, Solem and Harmelin do not square.
Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, had the
temerity to claim that "the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee."" Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor and Justice Souter, claimed that the Eighth Amendment
encompasses a narrow proportionality principle, which applies to capital
and noncapital sentences.2' However, Harmelin's sentence was
affirmed because his crime threatened to cause "grave harm" to
society."' One commentator has observed that "Ronald Harmelin should
have picked a different crime. He should have mugged an old man and
stolen his wallet, or kidnapped a child, or raped a woman at gunpoint, or
maimed a pedestrian while driving drunk, or beaten someone to death in
a quarrel." 3  Had he committed any of these crimes, as opposed to
possessing a little over one pound of cocaine, "he would not be facing
the certainty that he will never again set foot outside a Michigan state
penitentiary."'
In any event, while some may disagree with the premise that
possessing cocaine threatens to cause grave harm to society, at least the
constitutional focus is on the proportionality of punishment as it relates
to the culpability of the offense. By contrast, a flat declaration that no
proportionality principle is encompassed in the Eighth Amendment is
much more troubling. For starters, Justice Scalia disagrees with the
concept that English law included a proportionality requirement. "In
228. See id. at 994.
229. See id. at 994-96.
230. Id. at 965 (Scalia, J., plurality).
231. See id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
232. Id. at 1002. For an interesting discussion calling into question the gravity of
such harm, see Kelly A. Patch, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing
Merely Legislative Grace?, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1697.
233. Patch, supra note 232, at 1697 (quoting Stephen Chapman, Kilo for Kilo,
Sentence Was Cruel, Unusual, ST. LouIs POST DiSPATCH, July 7, 1991, at 3B).
234. Patch, supra note 232, at 1697 (quoting Chapman, supra note 233, at 3B).
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sum, we think it most unlikely that the English Cruel and Unusuall
Punishments Clause [in the English Bill of Rights] was meant to forbid
'disproportionate' punishments." 5  He further opines that "[tiihere is
even less likelihood that proportionality of punishment was one of the
traditional 'rights and privileges of Englishmen' apart from the
Declaration of Rights, which happened to be included in the Eighth
Amendment. ' '2n6 These conclusions are troubling not only because there
is ample evidence to the contrary,. 7 but also because the sources upon
which Justice Scalia relies most heavily in forming his opinion are
directly contrary to his conclusions.2s
Justice Scalia further argues that the "excessive fines" clause is
necessary because fines are a source of revenue."9 Thus, so runs the
argument, the temptation will be greater to fine the convicted
excessively than to punish excessively because fines raise money, while
imprisoning the convicted costs money. However, this argument, while
perhaps intuitively tempting, is not in accord with historical fact.
Specifically, Blackstone observed that "it is never usual to assess a
larger fine than a man is able to pay, without touching the implements of
his livelyhood; but to inflict corporal punishment, or a stated
imprisonment, which is better than an excessive fine, for that amounts to
imprisonment for life."'  Implicit in this statement is the notion that an
excessive fine is nefarious not because it unjustly enriches government,
235. Hannelin, 501 U.S. at 974.
236. Id.
237. See supra Part IV.A.1.
238. Justice Scalia relies heavily on Blackstone and Granucci. See Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 967-68, 970, 973 n.4, 974-75, 977, 979. Blackstone stated in no uncertain terms:
The method however of inflicting punishment ought always to be proportioned
to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means to exceed it:
therefore the pains of death, and perpetual disability by exile, slavery, or
imprisonment, ought never to be inflicted, but when the offender appears
incorrigible: which may be collected either from a repetition of minuter
offences; or from the perpetration of some one crime of deep malignity, which
of itself demonstrates a disposition without hope or probability of
amendment ....
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *12 (first emphasis added).
As for Granucci, the centerpiece of his argument is that "prior to adoption of the Bill
of Rights in 1689 England had developed a common law prohibition against excessive
punishments in any form." Granucci, supra note 113, at 847 (emphasis added).
Moreover, "the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689
was... a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate penalties." Id. at 860.
239. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 978 n.9.
240. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *373.
but because it excessively punishes the convicted. At any rate, the
declaration by two Supreme Court Justices that the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality requirement leaves the issue in a state of
unrest.
D. A Solem Reprise
The current state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence may be
summarized as follows. The Eighth Amendment precludes the infliction
of barbaric forms of punishment, without regard to the offense
committed?"' It also precludes the infliction of "humane" forms of the
death penalty when the penalty is disproportionate to the offense.' 2 It
further precludes the imposition of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole if the sentence is disproportionate, taking into
account the offense and attendant circumstances such as prior
convictions.24 The Eighth Amendment also bars a disproportionate
prison sentence if the nature of imprisonment is foreign to Anglo-
American standards.' Finally, the Eighth Amendment bars a
disproportionate prison sentence if the defendant has committed a status
offense.245 This brings the discussion full circle and begs the following
question: Under what circumstances, other than those previously cited,
will a prison sentence be so disproportionate to the sum total of morally
objectionable conduct that it will violate the Eighth Amendment? Based
on the previous analysis, it would seem less than forthright to say never.
If not never, however, then when?
There is no doubt that it will be a difficult task determining when a
criminal sentence, whether for one offense or an aggregate of offenses,2
6
241. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 (1991); Granucci, supra
note 113, at 842.
242. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 599.
243. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-303 (1983).
244. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 991; Weems, 217 U.S. at 377.
245. See Robinson v. United States, 370 U.S. 660, 677-78 (1962).
246. It was urged in Part III that the Double Jeopardy clause should not be invoked
to prevent multiple prosecutions for the same act. It was also suggested that this
temptation is, in part, due to the intuitive notion that someone is being punished to an
excessive degree. It is urged that this feeling of too much punishment be channeled into
the Eighth Amendment such that, no matter how many pieces into which a legislature
carves the act, there can only be a certain amount of punishment. This is the idea Justice
Field was punctuating when he declared that "[t]he [Eighth Amendment] inhibition is
directed against cruel and unusual punishments, whether inflicted for one or many
offenses." O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 364 (Field, J., dissenting). Consider the
following:
To be sure, it may be possible to hypothesize units of prosecution that
are so fragmented that to punish each separately would constitute
excessive punishment. But in that event, the fragmentation would be
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is so disproportionate to the culpable conduct that it crosses the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment threshold of constitutionality. However, it
seems more genuine to admit the difficulty of applying such a rule and
thus exercise its power in rare cases, rather than to proclaim no
proportionality principle exists while simultaneously carving out
exceptions on an ad hoc basis, as justice may require. Indeed, the fact
that "such scrutiny requires sensitivity to federalism concerns and
involves analysis that may at times be difficult affords no justification
for [the Supreme] Court's abrogation of its responsibility to uphold
constitutional principles."' 47  The practical difference between no
proportionality and a limited proportionality requirement is minimal.
The holding in Rummel is arguably defensible under either approach. In
fact, the Solem Court arguably could have held that the punishment was
not disproportionate, given Helm's recidivist tendencies. Harmelin,
however, is one of those rare cases where the outcome depends upon the
extent to which the Court deems proportionality to be required in
criminal punishment.
Having argued in favor of a limited proportionality component within
the Eighth Amendment, it is necessary to put forth a model in order to
determine when aggregated punishment is unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the culpable conduct. However, some preliminary
matters should be kept in mind. "Reviewing courts, of course, should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures
necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments
invalid because the Eighth Amendment already prohibits the State from
subjecting a defendant to excessive punishment. In other words, once it is
determined that a defendant can constitutionally be punished for his
conduct as a whole, the manner in which his conduct is divided into
separate units for purposes of calculating his total sentence is of no
constitutional significance except for deciding whether the total sentence
is excessive; and that is a subject for decision under [the] Eighth
Amendment and not the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Westen & Drubel, supra note 101, at 114 (footnotes omitted). Thus, if a defendant is
convicted of stealing ten dollars, "there is no functional difference between punishing the
entire theft by sixty days, or the theft of each separate dollar by six days, or the theft of
each penny by six minutes." Id. at 114 n.156. This is true because "the constitutional
question is whether the total penalty the defendant receives is excessive in light of his
conduct. And that is an Eighth Amendment question... ?" Id.; see Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955) (arguing that "[tlhe punishment appropriate for the
diverse federal offenses is a matter for the discretion of Congress, subject only to
constitutional limitations, more particularly the Eighth Amendment.").
247. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1017-18 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
for crimes .... ."'A This deference is required in all federal cases, as well
as most state cases, by separation of powers principles. 9 Just as courts
would be making law in guessing at the "correct" unit of prosecution for
statutes with ambiguous units of prosecution,20 so too would they be
making law in substituting their own values for those of the legislature.
Thus, "in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides
only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional
limits."' Given this deference, "a reviewing court rarely will be





Hence, in order for an appellate court to invalidate a criminal
sentence, it should be grossly disproportionate when compared to the
culpable conduct. "[S]ome State will always bear the distinction of
treating particular offenders more severely than any other State." 3
Thus, "[t]he inherent nature of our federal system and the need for
individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of
constitutional sentences."' '  Indeed, to allow courts to invalidate
punishments which are not grossly disproportionate might very well
have the effect, as Justice Scalia has warned, of creating "a ratchet
whereby a temporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes
a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling the States from giving
effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social conditions."' 5
248. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
249. As a technical matter, the Federal Constitution does not require states to
maintain a government whose separation of power models the federal government. In
fact, the Constitution only provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
As a practical matter, however, most states adhere to the concept of separation of
powers. Moreover, none of the example cases used in this Comment point to the
absence of a separation of powers requirement in order to encroach upon the province of
a legislature.
250. See supra Part II.
251. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.16.
252. Id.
253. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980).
254. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.17.
255. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991). However, consider the
scenario that a no-proportionality approach creates. Just as overly-eager courts could
create a one-way downward ratcheting effect, the more probable result, given the
democratic process and overly-cautious courts, is a one-way upward ratcheting effect. It
would no doubt be political suicide for a political candidate to take the stump while
advocating a desire to get soft on crime. In fact, lessening criminal punishment after a
temporary consensus of harshness would, perhaps, be just as politically damaging. One
need only recall the speed with which Jocelyn Elders was relieved of her Surgeon
General duties after having the audacity to suggest that the country should consider and
study the effect of legalizing some drugs. If, as has been argued, the Eighth Amendment
is not a purely majoritarian principle, then the Eighth Amendment is the last check on the
potential tyranny of the political process.
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With these warnings in mind, it is asserted that a Solem-type model
based on objective criteria would best serve the purpose of invalidating
grossly disproportionate punishment while maintaining fidelity to
separation of powers principles. First, courts should look to the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.z6 This gravity of the
offense analysis requires recognition of the fact that legislatures'
purposes are diverse and should be presumed legitimate and
constitutional. Second, courts should compare the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. Because legislatures have
various legitimate reasons for enacting punishment which does not seem
strictly graduated, a punishment scheme which punishes, say, armed
robbery more severely than, say, kidnapping (or vice versa) is not
problematic. However, legislative enactments that punish parking
offenses or a first offense of drug possession more harshly than second
degree murder or rape-as in Harmelin-require a more critical
review. 8  Third, courts should compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.2" This analysis
does not require strict-or, for that matter, even substantial-conformity
with other jurisdictions. Indeed, one jurisdiction will always punish an
act more severely than another jurisdiction. However, a look at other
jurisdictions will provide insight regarding whether a state has fallen
victim to the one-way "get tough on crime" ratcheting effect. If, as has
been argued, the Eighth Amendment has a counter-majoritarian
component,20 then complete deference to, like excessive judicial
encroachment upon, a legislature's punishment determination is
constitutionally impermissible.
V. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS
Having addressed the most relevant constitutional and judicial issues
concerning temporally individuated units of prosecution, it is time to
apply these concepts to actual cases. The first case, State v. Grayson,' a
Wisconsin Supreme Court case, provides an excellent example of how
not to resolve rule of lenity issues. The second case, Johnson v.
256. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
257. See id. at 291.
258. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting).
259. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92.
260. See supra note 190.
261. 493 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992).
Morgenthau, 2 2 a case from the Court of Appeals of New York, provides
an excellent example of a legislature's near plenary power to define
crimes, while still recognizing the importance of providing individuals
with notice of what is proscribed. The last case, People v. Djekich,23 a
California appellate case, ties together all of the concepts discussed in
this Comment and provides an excellent model for how temporal unit of
prosecution cases should be analyzed conceptually.
A. State v. Grayson
In State v. Grayson,24 the issue was whether the prosecutor could
charge an individual who had continuously failed to pay court-ordered
child support for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989, with four counts
of felony nonsupport.26 The child support statute read as follows: "Any
person who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to
provide... child support which the person knows or reasonably should
know the person is legally obligated to provide is guilty of a class E
felony."'2 66 A class E felony was punishable by a $10,000 fine, or two
years in prison, or both.27 Grayson pleaded guilty to four felony counts,
one count for each year, and received four two-year sentences, to run
consecutively. Grayson appealed his case to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, arguing that the statute could only be violated once with one
continuous act, irrespective of the number of days he failed to pay child
support.m
The parallels between this case and the Snow26 case are uncanny. In
both cases the prosecutor, and not the legislature, defined the unit of
prosecution, which both prosecutors decided sua sponte to be one year.27
In both cases the language of the statute itself did not provide multiple
units of prosecution. 7 Likewise, neither of the statutes in these two
262. 505 N.E.2d 240 (N.Y. 1987).
263. 280 Cal. Rptr. 824 (Ct. App. 1991).
264. 493 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992).
265. See id. at 24.
266. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(2) (West 1989), amended by WIs. STAT. ANN. §
948.22(2) (West 1994).
267. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3) (West 1989).
268. See Grayson, 493 N.W.2d at 25.
269. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
270. See Grayson, 493 N.V.2d at 24 n.1; Snow, 120 U.S. at 276-77.
271. See Grayson, 493 N.W.2d at 26; Snow, 120 U.S. at 284-86. In fact, the
Grayson court admitted that the statute provided no express unit of prosecution. In both
cases, the statutes proscribed the doing of something, whether living with women or
failing to pay child support, in excess of some legislatively defined number. See
Grayson, 493 N.W.2d at 25 (where it was a crime to fail to do something for more than a
certain number of days); Snow, 120 U.S. at 275-76 (where it was a crime to do
something with more than a certain number of women).
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cases had clarifying legislative history. Despite all of these
similarities, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the prosecutor could
charge one count of felony nonsupport for each 120-day term a person
fails to pay child support, even if that person failed to pay over one
continuous period.2 3 In side-stepping the rule of lenity argument put
forth by Grayson, the Court stated that the rule was inapplicable because
Grayson must have formed a new "mens rea" for each count of his
continuous act and because it was "appropriate" to allow multiple
punishment.274 The "mens rea" argument cannot seriously be treated as
anything but a makeweight argument, particularly in light of the fact that
Grayson was continuously failing to do something.
Thus, the difference between Grayson spending eight years in jail (for
four convictions) and two years (for one conviction) is the Court's
subjective opinion that it is "appropriate." This case is not a silly
parking hypothetical. This was an actual case wherein the determination
of whether Mr. Grayson spent an additional six years in prison depended
entirely upon the Court's disposition of this case. This case, quite
simply, is bad law.25 "Grayson was wrongly decided and... continuous
failure to support constitutes only one violation of the statute." 6
The Court had, and consequently missed, two opportunities to decide
272. See Grayson, 493 N.W.2d at 26; Snow, 120 U.S. at 274-86. The Grayson
court additionally agreed with the government's concession that the legislative history
did not advance the temporal unit of prosecution analysis. Note the rule of lenity may be
invoked without reference to the competing schools of thought concerning when a court
should decide that a statute is ambiguous. This is true because the statutes' permissible
units of prosecution are unclear after an examination of both the statutes themselves and
their respective legislative histories. See supra note 32.
273. See Grayson, 493 N.W.2d at 24.
274. Id. at 28.
275. Note that one might be tempted to raise a separation of powers argument, or
the lack thereof, at this point. However, Wisconsin is one of the many states which
adheres to the concept of separation of governmental powers, even though not explicitly
stated in its constitution. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982); see also
State exy rel. McCormack v. Foley, 118 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1962) ("The framers of the
Wisconsin Constitution vested the legislative power of the state in a senate and
assembly. The exercise of such power is subject only to the limitation and restraints
imposed by the Wisconsin Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the United
States."). Thus, "the power of the state legislature, unlike that of the federal congress, is
plenary in nature ...." Id. Given this, the Court in Grayson could not seriously argue
that it had any legislative power in this context. Hence, it was put in the unenviable
position either of letting Grayson "get off on a technicality" or of declaring what the
legislature meant to say (as opposed to what it did say).
276. Michelle A. Leslie, Note, State v. Grayson: Clouding the Already Murky
Waters of Unit of Prosecution Analysis in Wisconsin, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 811, 813.
this case correctly. First, an argument can be made that the statute
clearly did not provide for multiple units of prosecution. The statute
proscribed the failure to pay child support for 120 or more consecutive
days. Grayson violated the statute once, and only once, because he
failed to pay child support for more than 120 consecutive days. A
second count, whether brought at the same time as the first count or
subsequent to a conviction or acquittal, would therefore be prohibited by
the Double Jeopardy clause. If the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
prosecuting an individual twice for the same offense and if the offense is
defined as failing to pay child support for 120 or more consecutive days,
then Grayson can be tried only once.
Second, a compelling argument can be made that the statute's unit of
prosecution was unclear. If a legislature must clearly and
unambiguously intend to turn a single transaction into multiple
offenses,'" then Wisconsin may only try Grayson once because "[w]hen
[a legislature] leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to [a
legislature] an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of lenity. 278 A second prosecution would thus be barred by the
rule of lenity.
The point is not that a legislature could not punish these separate
temporal units-quite to the contrary, legislatures can create temporal
units of prosecution-but, rather, the Wisconsin Legislature did not
choose to punish these separate temporal units. It is submitted that the
Court was doing little more than saving the Legislature from its own
clumsy draftsmanship.2 9 While the Court's intentions may have been
admirable, the result does violence both to the concept that
legislatures-not courts-make law, and to the basic precept of criminal
law that individuals should be given adequate notice of what is
proscribed.
B. Johnson v. Morgenthau
In Johnson v. Morgenthau,m by contrast, the Court of Appeals of New
York recognized the delicate balance between legislative power and
notice to individuals of what is proscribed. Emanual Johnson, while in
277. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955).
278. Id. at 83.
279. To be fair, the state legislature, taking its cue from this case, immediately
remedied this unit of prosecution problem by amending the statute. The statute now
contains the following amendment: "A prosecutor may charge a person with multiple
counts for a violation under this subsection if each count covers a period of at least 120
consecutive days and there is no overlap between periods." Wis. STAT. ANN. §
943.22(2) (West 1996).
280. 505 N.E.2d 240 (N.Y. 1987).
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Bronx county, fired shots from a handgun at his sister after an
altercation.2" He fled the scene, but was arrested six days later in New
York county.m Bronx county charged Johnson, inter alia, with violating
a statute which proscribed possessing a loaded firearm outside one's
home or place of business. 3 Johnson agreed to a plea bargain and was
sentenced to a prison term of two and one-haif to five years.2 New
York County brought an indictment under the same statute for the same
continuous act of possession.' Johnson appealed this second action to
the Court of Appeals of New York. 6
The court concluded that Johnson "was engaged in an offense which
was continuous in nature, and for which he may be prosecuted only
once."2V In addition, the court recognized that "[t]he question is
essentially one of statutory construction. The Legislature is free to
define criminal conduct in terms of 'temporal units" '28 if it so desires.
Since "[t]he double jeopardy clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions protect an accused against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple
punishments for the same offense," 9 the second claim was barred
because Johnson "continuously 'possessed' the pistol for the six-day
period in question ..... 2  This reasoning reiterates the principle that the
question is not whether a legislature can define an offense by some
arbitrary unit of time, but whether it has so defined a crime.29
281. See id. at 241.
282. See id.
283. See id.; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1974).
284. See Johnson, 505 N.E.2d at 241.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 243.
288. Id. (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
290. Id. at 242.
291. The case of Webb v. State, 536 A.2d 1161 (Md. 1988), a Maryland case, is
another possession-type case with equally cogent reasoning. In Webb, the defendant was
spotted at two different times carrying a handgun. See id. at 1162. A statute made it a
misdemeanor for any person to wear, carry, or transport any handgun, on or about his
person. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (1996). The court held that when "mere
possession of a prohibited article is a crime, the offense is a continuing one because the
crime is committed each day the article remains in possession, as there is a continuing
course of conduct." Webb, 536 A.2d at 1164 (citation omitted).
"The unit of prosecution of that continuing crime is the wearing, carrying or
transporting of any handgun .... There is no requirement as to time, use, person at risk
or incident." Id. at 1165. Therefore, the court concluded that it could not "read into the
C. People v. Djekich
Lastly, in People v. Djekich,29 the Defendant pleaded nolo contendere
to ten counts of violating a zone ordinance.29 Djekich purchased two
buildings and subsequently converted both of them into duplexes.
24
After numerous warnings from the San Diego County Department of
Planning and Land Use, the County began citing Djekich for renting
duplexes on land zoned for single-family residential units. 5 A separate
ordinance provided that "[e]ach day or portion of a day that any person
violates or continues to violate this ordinance constitutes a separate
offense and may be charged and punished separately without awaiting
conviction on any prior offense." The punishment for each offense
was a fine not exceeding $1000 or jail time not to exceed six months, or
both. 297 Thus, Djekich was exposed to a maximum of a $10,000 fine, or
five years in prison, or both. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Djekich was
fined $10,000-$1000 for each of ten violations-and placed on
probation.293
The Court began its analysis by noting that absent "express legislative
direction to the contrary, where the commission of a crime involves
continuous conduct which may range over a substantial length of time
and defendant conducts himself in such a fashion with but a single intent
and objective, that defendant can be convicted of only a single
offense." 299  Thus, "where legislatively defined offenses involve
continuous conduct unseparated in any fashion artificially by the
legislature, '[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee
that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.' '3°°
Conversely, "the Double Jeopardy Clause [or the rule of lenity, for that
matter] is not violated by prosecution under a statute clearly designed by
the legislature to permit severability of otherwise continuous criminal
plain language of the section the intent that a lapse of time or more than one person put
at risk or multiple incidents would initiate separate offenses." Id. "To construe the
statute as the State would have us do would require us to doff our judicial robes and don
a legislative hat. We cannot indulge in such judicial legislation; we must take the statute
as it reads, not rewrite it." Id. Indeed, this case points up the weakness of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's reasoning in Grayson.
292. 280 Cal. Rptr. 824 (Ct. App. 1991).
293. See id. at 826. Djekich was originally charged with 28 violations, 18 of which
were dismissed as part of his plea agreement. See id.
294. See id. at 825.
295. See id. at 825-26.
296. Id. at 825 n.3.
297. See id. at 826 n.6.
298. See id. at 825-26.
299. Id. at 828.
300. Id. at 830 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977)).
[VOL. 36: 195, 1999] Temporal Units
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
conduct and thus accumulation of convictions and multiple
punishment. ' 30 ' Justice Work encapsulates the central theme of this
Comment in declaring that
a penal provision reflecting a clear legislative intent to permit pyramiding of
punishment through cumulative convictions by providing for a separate offense
for each day a defendant continues his/her criminal conduct is valid, providing
the fine imposed is not unconstitutionally excessiv~or the sentence imposed
does not constitute cruel and/or 
unusual punishment.
In other words, a legislature has broad discretion in enacting penal
provisions and specifying punishment for criminal offenses, and the only
check on this near plenary power is a judicial determination that the
punishment exceeds constitutional limits.3 According to Justice Work,
"[a] fine or punishment may be held unconstitutional if it is so excessive
or unusual by being so disproportionate to the offense committed that it
shocks public sentiment and conscience while offending fundamental
notions of human dignity." Thus, the zoning ordinance's temporal unit
of prosecution survives scrutiny and Djekich's punishment is
constitutionally permissible, so long as it does not run afoul of the
Eighth Amendment. °5
1. Solem's First Prong: Compare the Gravity of the Offense to the
Harshness of the Punishment
Under the Solem analysis articulated in Part IV, the first step in
determining whether punishment violates the Eighth Amendment is to
compare the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty.3 6
In making this determination, one must simultaneously keep in mind the
fact that legislatures' purposes are diverse and should be presumed
legitimate and constitutional.W It hardly seems controversial to state
that violations of zoning regulations, while perhaps annoying to some,
do not threaten the stability of society. Accordingly, it is likewise
301. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
302. Id. (citations omitted).
303. See id. at 830 n.12.
304. Id. at 831 n.12 (citations omitted).
305. Justice Work determined that Djekich waived his right to object to the
proportionality of the sentence by failing to raise an Eighth Amendment claim. See id. at
831. However, this Comment will assume, for pedagogical and illustrative purposes,
that Djekich did adequately raise an Eighth Amendment claim.
306. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
307. See supra Part IV.D.
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uncontroversial to state that the gravity of the offenses is relatively
slight. The penalty in this case was a fine of $10,000. In determining
whether this fine is grossly excessive, a few matters must be kept in
mind.
First, Djekich had been informed that he was violating zoning
regulations around March of 1987."' He was reminded on May 13, 1987
that he was violating zoning regulations." He was again reminded on
October 8, 1987 that he was violating zoning regulations and was
informed that he would be cited if he did not remedy the situation.31
Thus, Djekich violated the applicable zoning regulations for about seven
months with actual knowledge that what he was doing was unlawful.
Second, Djekich was shown a fair amount of restraint, as he was not
prosecuted until after he had been warned three times. Third, Djekich
did not receive any jail time. Lastly, the zoning regulation must be
presumed to be legitimate and constitutional. In weighing all of these
factors, one should have little trouble determining that Djekich's
punishment, while not insignificant, is not grossly disproportionate when
compared to his conduct.
2. Solem's Second Prong: Compare the Punishment at Issue With
Punishment Imposed Upon Individuals who Commit
Diffferent Offenses in the Same Jurisdiction
The second step is to compare the punishment imposed upon Djekich
with punishments imposed upon individuals in California for different
offenses-an intrajurisdictional comparison, if you will.31  One must
remind oneself that legislatures have various legitimate reasons for
enacting punishment that is not strictly graduated.' Hence, this
comparison is necessary only to determine whether a jurisdiction has
become blinded by Harmelin-caliber myopia in punishing a particular
offense.1 3 As previously noted, zoning violations are relatively minor
offenses. Thus, violators should be punished similarly to violators of
other relatively minor offenses.
In California, the zoning violations for which Djekich was convicted
are punished identically to violations of statutes that proscribe
interfering with personnel working an emergency scene,3 4 using terra
308. See Djekich, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 825-26.
311. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
312. See supra Part lV.D.
313. See supra Part lV.D.
314. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 402 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
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alba in the manufacture of candy,15 discarding a washing machine
without removing the door,16 obstructing a person from accessing public
land,37 knowingly using a slug in a -video arcade game318 or a pay
phone,31 9 conducting oneself in a disorderly fashion,3 2 and knowingly
misdirecting a prospective guest of any hotel by a taxicab driver.32
Though some of the offenses provide levity, the point is sufficiently
clear that zoning violators have not been singled out in California. In
other words, the intrajurisdictional comparison shows that zoning
violators are punished similarly to those who commit other minor
offenses. Accordingly, the second prong of the Solem test is satisfied.
3. Solem's Third Prong: Compare the Punishment at Issue with
Punishment Imposed Upon Individuals who Commit the
Same Offense in Different Jurisdictions
The final step in the proportionality analysis it to compare the
sentence imposed upon Djekich with sentences imposed upon similarly
situated individuals-that is, convicted violators of zoning regulations in
other jurisdictions.3  Such comparison does not require substantial
conformity with other jurisdictions. Rather, the critical inquiry is
whether a jurisdiction has ratcheted up its punishment for a particular
offense to a degree that is grossly in excess of other jurisdictions. "
Recall that each violation of the zoning regulation at issue in Djekich
was punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of up to
six months, and each day the individual violates the regulation is a
separate offense. 24 This enforcement scheme is in accord with other
jurisdictions. For example, Kansas law provides that a violation of a
zoning regulation is punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or
imprisonment for up to six months and each day the individual violates
315. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 402a (West 1988).
316. See id. § 402b.
317. See id. § 420.
318. See id. § 640a.
319. See id. § 640b.
320. See id. § 647.
321. See id. § 649. All of the offenses cited supra notes 315 through 322 are
misdemeanors, which are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six months
and/or a fine note exceeding $1000. See id. § 19.
322. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,291-92 (1983).
323. See supra Part IV.D.
324. See People v. Djekich, 280 Cal Rptr. 824, 825 n.3, 826 n.6 (Ct. App. 1991).
the regulation is a separate offense.3 s Likewise, New Hampshire law
provides that a violation of a zoning regulation is punishable by a fine of
up to $2000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year.3 6 Colorado law
provides that a violation of a zoning regulation is punishable by a fine of
up to $100 and/or imprisonment for not more than ten days, and each
day the individual violates the regulation is a separate offense."
Lastly, New York law provides that a violation of a zoning regulation
is punishable by a fine of up to $350 and/or imprisonment for up to six
months for a first offense." A second offense within five years of the
first offense is punishable by a fine of up to $750 and/or imprisonment
for up to six months.129 The third and subsequent offenses within a five-
year period are punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment
for up to six months.3" New York law further provides that it is a
separate offense for each week the regulation is violated.331
Based on this interjurisdictional comparison, it is apparent that all of
these jurisdictions are located fairly close to one another on the
punishment continuum. This finding warrants the conclusion that
California does not punish zoning regulation violators in a grossly
excessive manner. Indeed, California's punishment scheme is in
substantial conformity to the punishment schemes in other jurisdictions.
Substantial conformity, while not constitutionally necessary, is sufficient
to enable one to conclude that the punishment at issue does not violate
the Eighth Amendment.
4. Djekich 's Punishment was not Barred by the Rule of Lenity, it did
not Violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and it did not Violate the Eighth Amendment
Having run Djekich's punishment through the conceptual framework
proposed by this Comment, it is clear that his punishment was proper.
First, the regulation at issue unambiguously provided for separate
temporal units of prosecution. Thus, the rule of lenity has no
application. Second, the fact that the regulation provided for separate
units of prosecution nullifies the claim that Djekich's prosecution
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause; indeed, he was prosecuted for
different offenses-not "the same offense." Third, the punishment was
325. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-761(a) (1991).
326. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 676:17, 625:9, 651:2 (1996).
327. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-124(1) (West 1990).
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not grossly disproportionate to the culpable conduct for which he was
punished: the gravity of the offense merited. the gravity of the
punishment, the intrajurisdictional comparison shows that other offenses
of similar gravity are punished similarly, and the interjurisdictional
comparison shows that Djekich would have received substantially the
same punishment in all of the jurisdictions sampled.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legislatures-not prosecutors or judges-are given the power to
proscribe certain human behaviors and to provide for the manner in
which those behaviors will be punished. So long as a legislature is
sufficiently clear, it may provide that a continuous act is divisible
temporally for prosecution purposes. If a legislature clearly does not
provide for temporal units of prosecution, then the Double Jeopardy
Clause prevents more than one prosecution for the continuous violation
of a statute. If a legislature drafts a statute such that it is unclear what
temporal unit of prosecution was intended, then the rule of lenity
provides that an individual may be prosecuted only once for a continuing
violation of a continuous offense.
However, a legislature that speaks with sufficient clarity regarding a
statute's temporal unit of prosecution has near plenary power to define
the unit of prosecution with whatever temporal unit it deems desirable.
This power is subject only to a limited proportionality requirement. The
Eighth Amendment mandates that punishment, whether for a single
offense or an aggregate of offenses, not be grossly disproportionate to
the culpable conduct. A requirement of gross disproportionality grants
substantial deference to a legislature's inherent power to regulate
behavior, while simultaneously protecting the least desired segment of
society, convicted criminals, from the tyranny of the majority.
JACK BALDERSON, JR.
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